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INTRODUCTION
August 15, 1992 marked fifteen years since the Carter Administra-
tion formally inaugurated the United States bilateral investment treaty
(BIT) program. It was exactly fifteen years prior that Under Secretary
of State Richard N. Cooper had authorized negotiation of a new series
of bilateral treaties to protect U.S. investment in foreign countries.'
These first fifteen years of the BIT program comprise three distinct
periods of approximately equal length. In the first period, which ran
from early 1977 through the end of 1981, the principal accomplishment
of the program was the development of a model text for use in negotia-
tions.2 The second period, which ran from early 1982 through 1986,
featured the first wave of BIT negotiations, resulting in the conclusion
of ten BITs and their transmission to the Senate for advice and consent
to ratification.3 The third period, which began in 1988 and continues to
the present, has seen the approval of the first wave of BITs and the
negotiation and conclusion of a second wave of treaties, some of which
now have received Senate approval and a few of which have entered
into force.4
The first two periods, the development of the model negotiating text
and the first wave of negotiations, are the subject of a moderately
1. KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY AND
PRACTICE 29 (1992).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 11-41.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 42-54.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 55-94.
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extensive literature.5 This Article describes and appraises the second
wave of negotiations. It functions as a sequel to an earlier article6 that
described the first ten years of the program.
Although the second wave of negotiations continues, and thus any
conclusions about it necessarily are tentative, the second wave already
has developed a variety of characteristics that distinguish it from the
first wave. The goal of this Article is to identify the ways in which the
second wave appears to differ from the first and to assess the signifi-
cance of the differences.
Part I of this Article traces the evolution of the BIT program,
describing the principal events of each of the three periods of develop-
ment.7  Although certain elements of this material may be familiar to
those acquainted with the literature, a recapitulation is necessary in order
to place the second wave in context.
Part II describes some of the principal changes in U.S. foreign
investment policy that have accompanied the second wave of BITs. It
attempts to determine the extent to which these changes have been
reflected in the language of the current model negotiating text or the
treaties concluded during the second wave.
Part III traces the changes that have occurred in the model negotiat-
ing text in the transition from the first wave to the second.9 To provide
a baseline for considering the text as it appears in the second wave, this
5. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 1; Mark S. Bergman, Bilateral Investment Protection
Treaties: An Examination of the Evaluation and Significance of the U.S. Prototype Treaty, 16
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1983); Pamela B. Gann, The U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty
Program, 21 STAN. J. INT'L L. 373 (1985); K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral
Investment Treaties: Comments on Their Origin, Purposes, and General Treatment Stan-
dards, 4 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW 105 (1986); Joseph E. Pattison, The United States - Egypt
Bilateral Investment Treaty: A Prototype for Future Negotiation, 16 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 305
(1983); Wayne Sachs, The "New" U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus.
LAW 192 (1984); Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L LAW.
655 (1990); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United
States, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 201 (1988); Saul Aronson, Note, An Examination of Compen-
sation Terms in the United States - Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty, 16 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 287 (1984); Deirdre A. Cody, Note, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties:
Egypt and Panama, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 491 (1983); Patricia M. Robin, Note, The
BIT Won't Bite: The American Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, 33 AM. U.L. REv. 931
(1984); Timothy A. Steinert, Note, If the BIT Fits: The Proposed Bilateral Investment Treaty
Between the United States and the People's Republic of China, 2 J. CHINESE L. 405 (1988);
Kathleen Kunzer, Recent Development, Developing a Model Bilateral Investment, 15 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 273 (1983).
6. Vandevelde, supra note 5.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 11-98.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 99-130.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 131-253.
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part summarizes the most important features of the model text as it
developed in the first wave.
Part IV analyzes the substance of the BITs that have been concluded
during the second wave as of January 1993.10 It attempts to identify the
extent to which the negotiation of these treaties resulted in departures
from the model negotiating texts and assesses the significance of any
notable departures.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE BIT PROGRAM
A. 1977-1981: Launching the BIT Program
The BIT program was launched in 1977 as a successor to the 190
year old Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) treaty program.
The United States had begun negotiating FCNs during the American
Revolution largely as the basis for establishing commercial relations
with the European powers." Later, as trade with Latin American,
Asian, and African States opened up, FCNs were negotiated with these
countries as well. 2
Although the FCNs from the beginning had included provisions to
protect property owned by U.S. nationals but located in the territory of
the treaty partner, 13 after the Second World War, investment protection
became a primary purpose of the modem FCNs.14 By 1967, however,
there appeared to be no other countries willing to conclude a U.S. FCN
10. See infra text accompanying notes 254-651.
11. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Limits and Navigation, Oct. 27, 1795, U.S.-Spain, 8
Stat. 138; Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat.
116; Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Jan., 1787, U.S.-Morocco, 8 Stat. 100; Treaty of Amity
and Commerce, July, 1785, U.S.-Prussia, 8 Stat. 84; Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Apr. 3,
1783, U.S.-Swed., 8 Stat. 60; Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Oct. 8, 1782, U.S.-Neth., 8
Stat. 32; Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Feb. 6, 1778, U.S.-Fr., 8 Stat. 12.
12. See, e.g., Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 24, 1891, U.S.-Congo, 27
Stat. 926; Treaty of Peace and Amity, Mar. 31, 1854, U.S.-Japan, 11 Stat. 597; Treaty of
Peace, Amity and Commerce, July. 3, 1844, U.S.-China, 8 Stat. 592; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 4, 1859, U.S.-Para., 12 Stat. 1091; Treaty of Peace, Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation, May 13, 1858, U.S.-Bol., 12 Stat. 1003 Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation, July 27, 1853, U.S.-Arg., 10 Stat. 1005; Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation, July 10, 1851, U.S.-Costa Rica, 10 Stat. 916; Treaty of
Peace, Friendship, Navigation, June 13, 1839, U.S.-Ecuador, 8 Stat. 534, General Convention
of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation, May 16, 1832, U.S.-Chile, 8 Stat. 434; General
Convention of Peace, Amity, Navigation and Commerce, Oct. 3, 1824, U.S.-Colom., 8 Stat.
306.
13. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 14-19.
14. Herman Walker Jr., Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign
Investment: Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 230 (1956).
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treaty."5  Accordingly, the FCN program expired in the mid-1960s. 16
At the very time the U.S. FCN program was drawing to a close,
several European States were enjoying considerable success negotiating
bilateral investment protection agreements which differed from the U.S.
FCNs in that they were devoted exclusively to investment protection.'7
After repeated calls from Congress and the U.S. business community for
a U.S. investment treaty program similar to the European programs, the
State Department decided in 1977 to launch the U.S. BIT program.' 8
The BIT program, as it was conceived in the mid-1970s, had a
number of purposes. One of the most important, at least in the minds of
the early proponents of these treaties, was to counter the claim made
during the 1970s by many developing countries that customary interna-
tional law no longer required that expropriation be accompanied by
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation, if indeed it ever had. 19
This claim was embodied most visibly in the U.N. General Assembly's
adoption in 1974 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States (CERDS), which had provided that compensation for expropria-
tion was to be measured by the law of the expropriating State.20 That
is, the CERDS seemed not only to challenge the standard of prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation, but to assume that there was no
international minimum standard at all. The United States hoped to
create a network of bilateral treaties embracing the prompt, adequate,
and effective standard that would counter assertions that State practice
no longer supported that standard.2'
A second purpose was to protect existing stocks of investment
owned by U.S nationals and companies in the territory of other States.22
U.S. BIT negotiators, at least at the inception of the program, did not
15. VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 19.
16. The last two treaties were with Togo and Thailand, both signed in 1966. See Treaty
of Amity and Economic Relations, Feb. 8, 1966, U.S.-Togo, 18 U.S.T. 1; Treaty of Amity
and Economic Relations and Exchange of Notes, May 27, 1966, U.S.-Thail., 19 U.S.T. 5843.
17. VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 19-20.
18. ld. at 20-22.
19. See, e.g., Rudolf Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien
Property, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 553 (1981); Burns H. Weston, The Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties and the Deprivation of Foreign Owned Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 437 (1981).
20. G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251
(1975) (Article 2.2(c) provides that each State has the right "[t]o nationalize, expropriate, or
transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be
paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regula-
tions and all circumstances that State considered pertinent.").
21. VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 21.
22. Id.
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consider the promotion of future investment to be a goal of the BITs.23
The promotion of investment, in particular countries would have been
inconsistent with the U.S. policy of letting the market direct investment
flows and could have raised opposition to these treaties on the part of
labor groups concerned about the loss of jobs.24 Even had the promo-
tion of foreign investment been a goal of the program, U.S. negotiators
saw no evidence that a BIT actually would result in increased invest-
ment in a particular country. 25 Rather, investment decisions were based
on numerous factors - such as political stability, the availability of low
wage labor or natural resources, the development of the infrastructure,
the size of the domestic market, and the legal climate - very few of
which were addressed by a BIT.26
A third purpose of the BITs was to depoliticize investment dis-
putes. 27  Traditionally, the remedies available to an investor whose
investment was expropriated or otherwise injured by actions of the host
State depended upon the involvement of the investor's government in
the dispute. 28 This resulted in the U.S. government's routine involve-
ment in disputes between individual investors and foreign States, which
inevitably complicated the conduct of foreign policy. 29 The BITs were
intended to establish legal remedies for investment disputes that would
not necessitate the involvement of the investor's own government.
The first four years of the BIT program were devoted almost entire-
ly to the preparation of a model text for use in negotiations.3 ° The text
was a mixture of provisions taken from the modern FCNs and the
European bilateral investment protection agreements.
The model negotiating texts were approved through a lengthy
process of interagency consultations. In early 1980, primary responsibil-
ity for the BIT program was shifted from the State Department to the
Office of the United States Trade Representative. Because the two
agencies did not agree in all respects on the content of the model
negotiating text, the transfer resulted in further delays in the develop-
ment of the text.
32
23. Id. at 22.
24. Id.
25. See Robin, supra note 5, at 942-43.
26.. VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 32.
27. Id. at 22-25.
28. l, at 7-14. See also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Reassessing the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 115 (1988).
29. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., ROBERT KENNEDY AND HiS TIMES 625-29
(1978).
30. VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 29-31.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 30.
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Agreement finally was reached in December 1981 on a model
negotiating text, which was used in negotiations beginning the following
month.33 The commencement of negotiations, however, did not end the
process of preparing the model text. Rather, negotiations had the effect
of identifying ambiguities and even contradictions in the language so
laboriously worked over by the interagency group.34
As a result, the model text was revised several times in 198231
before the relevant agencies reached a relatively permanent agreement
on a January 1983 draft (hereinafter "the 1983 draft"). 6 The 1983 draft
was considerably streamlined in February 1984 (hereinafter "the 1984
draft"), with few substantive changes. 37 The model ne-gotiating text was
revised again in September 1987 (hereinafter "the 1987 draft"),38 in
February 1991 (hereinafter "the 1991 draft"), 39 and on:e more in Febru-
ary 1992 (hereinafter "the 1992 draft"). 40 Changes made since 1984,
however, have been relatively minor.4
B. 1982-1986: The First Wave of Negotiations
The first wave of negotiations began with Egypt and Panama in
early 1982. Over the next four years, BITs were concluded with ten
States: Egypt,42 Panama,43 Morocco,44 Zaire,45 Cameroon,46 Bangla-
33. Id
34. Id.
35. One early version of the model negotiating text, dated January 11, 1982, is reprinted
in VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, app. A-I.
36. Id The January 1983 draft is reprinted in id. app. A-2 [hereinafter 1983 draft].
37. Id. at 31. The February 1984 draft is reprinted in id. app. A-3 [hereinafter 1984
draft].
38. The September 1987 draft is reprinted in id. app. A-4 [hereinafter 1987 draft].
39. Unpublished draft on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law [hereinaf-
ter 1991 draft].
40. Unpublished draft on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law [hereinaf-
ter 1992 draft].
41. See infra text accompanying notes 148-253.
42. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Arab Republic of Egypt
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Sept, 29, 1982, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 24, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Egypt BIT].
43. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Panama Concern-
ing the Treatment and Protection of Investments, Oct. 27, 1982, S. TREATY Doc. No. 14, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Panama BIT].
44. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Morocco
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, July 22, 1985, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 18, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Morocco BIT].
45. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Zaire Concerning
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Aug. 3, 1984, S. TREATY DOC.
No. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Zaire BIT].
46. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Cameroon
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desh,47 Senegal,48 Haiti,49 Turkey5° and Grenada.5'
This first wave of BITs established several characteristics of the
negotiations that have remained unchanged. One feature of these
negotiations was the unwillingness of the United States to compromise
on the standard of compensation or the right of investors to binding
third-party arbitration of investment disputes. 2 A second feature was
the practice of developing relatively standard fallback positions with
respect to provisions on which the United States was willing to compro-
mise.53 Accordingly, where the United States did agree to concessions,
they often would be very nearly uniform among the treaties.
This unwillingness to compromise limited the number of agreements
that the United States was able to negotiate. After four years of negoti-
ations, the United States had concluded only ten agreements.
At the same time, however, the United States could find some
satisfaction in the diversity of States that had concluded BITs. At the
end of the first wave, the United States had treaties with countries in
Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Caribbean. BIT
partners ranged from important regional powers, such as Turkey and
Egypt, to small island States, such as Grenada and Haiti. Further,
whereas the post-war FCNs generally had been targeted at developed
countries, particularly those in Europe, that already were in agreement
with U.S. investment policy, the first wave of BITs typically were with
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Feb. 26, 1985, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 22, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Cameroon BIT].
47. Treaty Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of Bangla-
desh Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Mar. 12, 1986,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 23, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Bangladesh BIT].
48. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Senegal Concern-
ing the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Dec. 6, 1983, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 15, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Senegal BIT].
49. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Haiti Concerning
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Dec. 13, 1983, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 16, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Haiti BIT].
50. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey Concern-
ing the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Dec. 3, 1985, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 19, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Turkey BIT].
51. Treaty Between the United States of America and Grenada Concerning the Recipro-
cal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, May 2, 1986, S. TREATY Doc. No. 25, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Grenada BIT].
52. VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 125, 172.
53. For example, a number of States were unable to agree to a standard provision
guaranteeing to investors the right to transfer currency out of the host State freely and without
delay. The United States developed a relatively standard escape clause permitting delays in
transfer in certain circumstances. Although there were differences of detail, the essential
structure of the clause was the same in all BITs. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 144-46.
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U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties
developing countries that had not necessarily been associated with the
economic policy of western Europe and the United States.
In March 1986, President Reagan began the process of transmitting
the first wave of BITs to the Senate for advice and consent to ratifica-
tion. The program then went into a hiatus while the executive branch
awaited Senate approval. U.S. BIT negotiators, in effect, decided to
await the results of Senate action before negotiating or concluding any
additional agreements.
Hearings were held on the BITs on August 11, 1986.-4 The Senate
took no further action on the BITs, however, until 1988.
C. 1988-1992: The Second Wave of Negotiations
In the time between the transmission of the BITs to the Senate in
1986 and the next Senate action in 1988, events in Haiti and Panama
called into question whether the Senate should approve a BIT with
either nation. In February 1986, after popular uprisings forced Haitian
ruler Jean-Claude Duvalier to leave the country, a military junta took
power with a promise that elections would be held. 55 Elections were
scheduled, then cancelled amid violent protests over allegations that the
military intended to control the results.56 Elections finally were held in
January 1988, but when newly elected President Leslie F. Manigat
attempted to remove the army chief of staff from power, he was over-
thrown and exiled. 7 The United States responded to these events by
terminating financial assistance to Haiti. 8
In February 1988, federal grand juries in Miami and Tampa indicted
Manuel Noriega, the commander of the Panamanian Defense Forces, on
drug charges. 59 Efforts by Panamanian President Eric Arturo Delvalle to
remove Noriega from power led to his own overthrow and the installa-
tion of a Noriega ally as the new President.6° The United States refused
to recognize the new government and imposed a number of economic
sanctions on Panama, including freezing Panamanian bank accounts in
54. See Bilateral Investment Treaties with Panama, Senegal, Haiti, Zaire, Morocco,
Turkey, Cameroon, Bangladesh, Egypt and Grenada: Hearings Before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
55. See generally Robert I. Rotberg, Haiti's Past Mortgages Its Future, 67 FOREIGN
AIF., Fall 1988, at 93-94.
56. Id. at 94.
57. Id. at 95.
58. Id. at 94-95.
59. See generally Charles Maechling, Washington's Illegal Invasion, 79 FOREIGN POL'Y,
Summer 1990, at 113, 116.
60. Id. at 116.
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the United States and blocking currency transfers from the United States
by the Panamanian government. 6'
As a result of the events in Haiti and Panama, the Senate declined to
give further consideration to either the Haiti or Panama BITs. The
remaining eight BITs, however, were approved on October 20, 1988,
and ratified by the President on December 6, 1988.
Senate approval of the first wave of BITs in late 1988 ended the
negotiating hiatus. Further, the collapse of the Soviet empire at the end
of the 1980s reinvigorated the program. With the Soviet Union and
several Eastern European States moving toward democracy and market
economies, the United States opened BIT negotiations with several
formerly communist States, including the Soviet Union.
The first of these States to conclude a BIT with the United States
was Poland, which signed its BIT on March 21, 1990.62 Three months
later, the Poland BIT was transmitted to the Senate for advice and
consent. Meanwhile, the U.S. invasion of Panama on December 20,
1989, removed General Noriega from power. As a result, the Senate
decided to consider the Panama BIT along with the Poland BIT, approv-
ing both on October 28, 1990.
Negotiations with the Soviet Union were very far advanced in late
1991, when the Soviet Union disintegrated and was succeeded by the
Commonwealth of Independent States. Negotiations then resumed with
several of the former Soviet republics.
Eastern Europe, however, was not the only scene of activity.
Negotiations continued in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Between
early 1989 and January 1993, twelve BITs were signed. In addition to
Poland, treaties were signed with Argentina,63 Armenia,64 Bulgaria,65 the
61. Id. at 117.
62. Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Poland Concerning
Business and Economic Relations, Mar. 21, 1990, S. TREATY Doc. No. 18, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Poland BIT].
63. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 2, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Argentina BIT].
64. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Armenia Concern-
ing the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Sept. 23, 1992 (unpublished
treaty, on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law) [hereinafter Armenia BIT].
65. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Bulgaria Concern-
ing the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Sept. 23, 1992, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Bulgaria BIT].
(Vol. 14:621
U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties
Congo,66 the Czech and Slovak Republic, 67 Kazakhstan,' Kyrgyzstan, 69
Romania, 70 Russia,71 Sri Lanka,72 and Tunisia.73 The Czech and Slovak
Republic separated into two States, the Czech Republic and the Slovak
Republic, effective January 1, 1993, with the result that the Czech and
Slovak Republic BIT has been succeeded by two treaties, one with each
Republic. 74 Accordingly, the second wave now includes thirteen trea-
ties.
U.S. BIT negotiators attached particular significance to the conclu-
sion of BITs both with the former communist States and with Argentina.
The Soviet bloc had been among the foremost opponents of international
protection for property rights,75 while Argentina historically had been a
firm adherent to the Calvo Doctrine.76
66. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of the People's Republic of the Congo Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and
Protection of Investment, Feb. 12, 1990, S. TREATY Doc. No. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)
[hereinafter Congo BIT].
67. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Oct. 22,
1991, S. TREATY Doc. No. 31, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter Czech and Slovak
BITs].
68. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Kazakhstan
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, May 19, 1992,
Hein's No. KAV 3249, Temp. State Dep't No. 92-113 [hereinafter Kazakhstan BIT].
69. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of'Investment, Jan. 19, 1993
(unpublished treaty, on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law) [hereinafter
Kyrgyzstan BIT].
70. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of Romania Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
May 28, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 36, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter Romania
BIT].
71. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, June 17, 1992, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 33, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter Russia BIT].
72. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Democratic Socialist Republic
of Sri Lanka Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Sept.
20, 1991, S. TREATY Doc. No. 25, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter Sri Lanka BIT].
73. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Tunisia Concern-
ing the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, May 15, 1990, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 6, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Tunisia BIT].
74. See infra text accompanying note 428.
75. See, e.g., Report of the Centre on Transnational Corporations on Work on the
Formulation of the United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N.
Doc. E/C. 10119851s/2, excerpted in Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1049-51
(2d ed. 1987).
76. The Calvo Doctrine (named for the Argentine jurist, Carlos Calvo) holds that aliens
are entitled to no more than national treatment from a host state and that the host state is
responsible to an alien, if at all, only in municipal courts. See generally Alden F. Abbott,
Latin American and International Arbitration Conventions: The Quandry of Non-Ratification,
17 HARv. INT'L L.J. 131 (1976). The Calvo Doctrine thus is inconsistent with both the
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The Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted hearings on the
BITs with the Congo, the Czech and Slovak Republic, Russia, Sri
Lanka, and Tunisia on August 4, 1992.77 The Senate gave its advice
and consent to ratification on August 11, 1992. The Romania BIT was
transmitted to the Senate on August 3, 1992,78 while the Argentina 79 and
Bulgaria 0 BITs were transmitted on January 13, 1993. BITs with
Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are still awaiting transmittal to
the Senate.
As of May 1, 1993, thirteen BITs had entered into force. These are
the BITs with Grenada,"' Cameroon,82 Bangladesh, 3 Zaire,84 Turkey, 5
Senegal,8 6 Morocco,8 7 Panama,8 8 Egypt, 9 the Czech Republic," the
Slovak Republic, 9' Tunisia,92 and Sri Lanka. 93 In sum, all of the BITs in
the first wave of negotiation have entered into force, with the exception
of the Haiti BIT. Of the treaties in the second wave, only those with
the Czech and Slovak Republics, Tunisia, and Sri Lanka are in force. 94
Because no BIT has been in force for more than four years, relative-
ly little information is available to assess the success of the first wave of
substantive and the remedial provisions of the BIT.
77. See Treaty with the People's Republic of the Congo Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, S. EXEC. REP. No. 44, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1992); Treaty with Tunisia Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, S. EXEC. REP. No. 45, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1992); Treaty with Sri Lanka
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, S. EXEC. REP. No.
46, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1992); Treaty with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, S. ExEc. REP. No.
47, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1992); Treaty with the Russian Federation Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, S. EXEC. REP. No. 48, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1992).
78. Romania BIT, supra note 70, at III.
79. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, at II.
80. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, at Ill.
81. Grenada BIT, supra note 51 (entered into force Mar. 3, 1989).
82. Cameroon BIT, supra note 46 (entered into force Apr. 6, 1989).
83. Bangladesh BIT, supra note 47 (entered into force July 25, 1989).
84. Zaire BIT, supra note 45 (entered into force July 28, 1989).
85. Turkey BIT, supra note 50 (entered into force May 18, 1992).
86. Senegal BIT, supra note 48 (entered into force Oct. 25, 1990).
87. Morocco BIT, supra note 44 (entered into force May 29, 1991).
88. Panama BIT, supra note 43 (entered into force May 30, 1991).
89. Egypt BIT, supra note 42 (entered into force June 27, 1992).
90. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1993).
91. Id.
92. Tunisia BIT, supra note 73 (entered into force Feb. 7, 1993).
93. Sri Lanka BIT, supra note 72 (entered into force May 1, 1993).
94. For a discussion of the entry into force of these two BITs, see infra text accompa-
nying note 428.
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treaties. However, disputes which may put BIT provisions to the test
have begun to arise. For example, during hearings on the BITs on
August 4, 1992, the Bush administration reported that it had been
notified by U.S. investors in Panama of a potential BIT violation by
Panama. After the U.S. embassy made a demarche to the Panamanian
government, however, the practice which had been the subject of the
complaint ceased.95
Disputes also have arisen between the United States and Zaire over
the seizure of petroleum product installations in Zaire and the destruc-
tion of property during civil disturbances in 1991.96 The governments
of the United States and Zaire have been in consultation with respect to
these disputes.97 Further, on February 2, 1993, the American Manufac-
turing and Trading Corporation submitted to International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) a request for arbitration of a
claim against Zaire, the first dispute to have been submitted to arbitra-
tion under a U.S. BIT.
U.S. investment in several countries with BITs has increased since
the treaties entered into force. At the August 4, 1992 Senate hearings,
however, a Bush administration representative noted that it was unclear
to what extent the increased investment is attributable to the BITs.9
II. INVESTMENT POLICY IN THE SECOND WAVE
The commencement of the second wave of BIT negotiations oc-
curred in a world remarkably changed from that which had greeted the
first wave only seven years before. Although these changes have altered
U.S. investment policy to some extent, they have not always been
reflected in the BITs. This Part describes some of the trends that could
be expected to affect the BIT program and assesses their impact, if any,
on the BITs concluded to date.
A. Use of Investment Policy to Promote Foreign Policy
By far the most important change that occurred in the interim
between the beginning of the first wave of negotiations in 1982 and the
beginning of the second wave in early 1989 was the collapse of the
Soviet empire, followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself.
95. See Treaty with the Russian Federation Concerning the Encouragement and Recipro-
cal Protection of Investment, S. EXEC. REP. No. 48, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1992).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 4-5.
98. Id. at 5.
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The former communist regimes not only ceased to be adversaries in the
geopolitical realm, but began to embrace openly both democratic gov-
ernment and free market economics.
These were trends which the United States was anxious to endorse
and facilitate. One way to do this was to promote increased private
investment in Eastern Europe and in the States that had constituted the
former Soviet Union. To assist in promoting foreign investment, the
United States, among other efforts, encouraged these States to negotiate
and conclude a BIT.
BITs with the former communist States could have a variety of
impacts, all of which would be advantageous to U.S. foreign policy. 99
They would serve as a symbol that these States had embraced the pro-
market economic policy endorsed by the United States, which could, in
turn, attract private investment to these States. By obtaining guarantees
of national and most favored nation treatment, the BITs would open
these new market economies to U.S. investors, who would have the
same legal right to acquire and establish investment as local or Europe-
an investors. Moreover, once established, the BITs would provide
genuine protection for U.S. investment, which would be beneficial to
U.S. investors and which could have the effect of attracting still more
investment. The treaties also would perform the educational function of
informing government officials with virtually no experience in operating
a market economy of the kinds of policies considered necessary or
advisable by private investors. U.S. negotiators, for example, sometimes
provided copies of the model negotiating text to States that were draft-
ing foreign investment codes, in the hopes that these States would enact
codes not inconsistent with BIT principles. Finally, the BITs would
tend to lock in pro-market policies once adopted, so that States would
be less likely to retreat to nonmarket principles during times of econom-
ic adversity.
Congress appeared fully to support the new policy of negotiating
BITs in Eastern Europe. In its Support for East European Democracy
Act of 1989,'0° Congress called upon the President to negotiate bilateral
investment treaties with Poland and Hungary in particular.
The first East European State to begin formal BIT negotiations with
the United States was Poland. Negotiations began with Poland in 1989
and a treaty was concluded the following year. Indeed, negotiations
with former communist States have largely dominated the second wave
of BITs. Of the thirteen BITs included in the second wave, nine are
99. See iaJ at 2-3.
100. Pub. L. No. 101-179, § 306, 103 Stat. 1298, 1314.
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with Eastern European or former Soviet States - those with Poland, the
Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Romania, Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Bulgaria.
The remaining four BITs are with countries dispersed around the
globe: Argentina, the Congo, Tunisia, and Sri Lanka. Thus, the second
wave, like the first, continues to enjoy geographic diversity. No other
region, however, can begin to compare with Eastern Europe for the
intensity of BIT activity in the second wave.
The use of BITs to signal support for political events in Eastern
Europe reflected a change in BIT policy. The policy at the inception of
the first wave had been to depoliticize investment matters, particularly
investment disputes. The theory underlying the BITs had been that
investment flows should be channeled by market forces, rather than
public policy, and that investment matters and foreign policy generally
should be kept separate.' 0' The second wave of negotiations, by con-
trast, represented a willingness to use BITs to accomplish political
objectives.
The Eastern European BIT negotiations, however, were not the first
instance of using the BITs to signal political support, even if they were
the most visible. Discussions leading to the conclusion of the Grenada
BIT had commenced two years after the August 1983 invasion -of
Grenada and the restoration of democracy. The Grenada BIT was
concluded in a single, hour-long negotiating session that resulted in a
treaty identical to the 1984 model negotiating text. 1° 2 The treaty seemed
quite clearly an attempt to signal that the U.S. invasion had been a
success and that conditions for foreign investment in Grenada now were
favorable.
The entry into force of the Panama BIT similarly reflected other
foreign policy concerns. As already noted, °3 the Senate had delayed
consideration of that treaty because of a rupture of political relations
between the Bush administration and Manual Noriega. The Senate
ultimately did approve the Panama BIT in October 1990, only ten
months after a U.S. invasion removed Noriega from power.
The Congo BIT also had been negotiated at a politically propitious
moment. Just prior to a State visit to Washington in early 1990, the
Congolese government notified the United States that it would be
interested in concluding a BIT. Negotiations were completed during the
101. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Of Politics and Markets: The Shifting Ideology of the
BITs, INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. (forthcoming 1994).
102. VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 38.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
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State visit and an agreement signed at the conclusion of the visit.' °4 The
final agreement was identical to the 1987 model negotiating text. In
both cases, the almost unavoidable inference is that the value of the
BITs as political symbols was an important factor in their negotiation.
The desire to subordinate the BITs to other foreign policy concerns
also was reflected in the text of the BIT itself. As described below, the
BITs contain a provision which exempts from their coverage any mea-
sure necessary to protect a State's essential security interests,'15 language
which also had appeared in the modem FCNs. 1' 6 During the 1986
Senate hearings on the BITs, the Reagan Administration asserted that
this exemption provision is self-judging, meaning that each State is the
sole judge of what measures are necessary to protect its essential securi-
ty interests,' °7 a position that the United States had argued unsuccessful-
ly with respect to the FCN counterpart provision two years earlier
during the jurisdictional phase of Nicaragua's claim against the United
States before the International Court of Justice. 8
The original purpose of this interpretation had been to shelter U.S.
support for the Nicaraguan contras from the Nicaragua FCN. The
reiteration of this interpretation with respect to the BITs reflected, in
part, a desire to reaffirm the argument that the United States had made
unsuccessfully before the Court and, in part, a desire to reserve the
discretion to derogate from the BITs in furtherance of other foreign
policy concerns.
Nor was the desire to ensure the subordinate position of the BITs
relative to other aspects of foreign policy limited to the executive
branch. During these same hearings, Senator Christopher Dodd ex-
pressed the concern that a BIT might preclude the United States from
imposing economic sanctions on another State, such as an assets
freeze. 1°" He proposed that the BITs contain a provision which would
permit them to be terminated for foreign policy reasons. His proposal,
however, ultimately was not adopted.
The Senate did, however, attach an understanding to the first eight
BITs, stating that the United States reserved the right to take measures
104. VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 38.
105. See infra text accompanying note 145.
106. See infra text accompanying note 511.
107. See Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States International
Investment Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 37-38
(1989).
108. The court rejected this argument in its Judgment on the Merits. See Military and
Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
109. See Alvarez, supra note 106, at 37-39.
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necessary to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threats to national
security."0 The understanding did not explain how such threats were to
be determined. Thus, in the final analysis, the understanding added
nothing to what already was on the face of the essential security inter-
ests exception. Yet, the understanding does reflect Senate concern about
preserving for the United States the flexibility to take national security
measures without violating the BIT. Indeed, it could be argued that, at
least in the immediate aftermath of the Nicaragua case, the Senate
would not have approved the first eight BITs without some assurance
that such flexibility had been preserved.
B. The Changing Investment Climate
A second trend, related to the first, was the change in the global
investment climate. As noted above, a major purpose of the BITs was
to establish a body of State practice in support of the prompt, adequate,
and effective standard of compensation, which was under attack by
communist and developing States during the 1970s."' The United
States had attempted to reaffirm, through a network of BITs, that
international law protected private property, in the face of arguments
that private property was subject to expropriation without full compensa-
tion in the name of economic development and national sovereignty.
By the late 1980s, however, the collapse of the Soviet model of
political and economic organization, as well as changing attitudes
toward private investment in developing countries, appeared to have
robbed the attack on private property of much of its force. International
arbitral awards of recent years continue to support the prompt, adequate,
and effective standard" 2 and few voices have been raised in political
fora to question that standard.
As a result, the need for a network of treaties in support of the prompt,
adequate, and effective standard seems less urgent than it did in the 1970s,
when the program was conceived, or the early 1980s, when the first wave
of negotiations began. Yet, however pronounced it may be, this trend
appears to have had little, if any, impact on the expropriation compensation
provision of the BITs. All BITs continue to include the expropriation
compensation provision without substantive modification.
110. See Investment Treaties with Senegal, Zaire, Morocco, Turkey, Cameroon, Bangla-
desh, Egypt, and Grenada, S. ExEc. REP. No. 32, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
112. See Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern
Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 474, 488 n.116
(1991).
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In at least one respect, however, the changing investment climate
has had a marked impact on the negotiated BITs. The international
movement toward free market economic policies has expanded the
number of States wishing to negotiate a BIT with the United States. For
many developing countries, the BIT represents a tangible way of signal-
ing their receptivity to foreign investment, and thus may seem to assist
in attracting capital from the United States and other developed coun-
tries. This trend has strengthened the bargaining position of the United
States, with the result that it has been less willing to make concessions
than in the past. For example, concessions on performance require-
ments" 3 and currency exchange controls 14 are less common in the
second wave than in the first. Even minor, nonsubstantive changes in
wording that have appeared liberally throughout the first wave have
become more infrequent in the second wave, so that treaties in the
second wave track the precise wording of the model negotiating texts to
a much greater degree than those in the first.
The tougher negotiating stance with respect to currency exchange
controls is potentially inconsistent with earlier BIT policy. Although it
always had been the United States' strategy to make relatively few
concessions, that approach was tempered by a concern that BIT partners
not be induced to make promises that they could not keep. BITs were
intended to provide genuine protection for investors and not be mere
empty endorsements of market economics. U.S. negotiators thus were
willing to include an escape clause for situations where a promise of
free transfer of all payments related to an investment was unrealistic. A
State that is unable to permit free transfer of sale or liquidation proceeds
and that cannot rely on an escape clause will be left either to violate the
BIT or to invoke some general treaty exception, such as those for
preserving the public order or the State's essential security interests. It
would seem preferable to encourage States to make any limitations on
the right of free transfer of currency consistent with a carefully struc-
tured and relatively confining escape clause, rather than forcing them to
invoke a more general clause that, once properly invoked, may authorize
a more open-ended array of measures restricting the free exchange of
currency.
113. See infra text accompanying notes 399-409, 423-27, 532-35.
114. Four BITs in the first wave, those with Egypt, Zaire, Bangladesh and Turkey,
contained escape clauses permitting host states to temporarily delay the transfer of sale or
liquidation proceeds during periods of exceptional balance of payment difficulties, subject to
certain exceptions. Only two BITs in the second wave, those with Tunisia and Sri Lanka,
contain such a provision. See infra text accompanying notes 381-87.
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C. Rise of U.S. Economic Protectionism
The commencement of the second wave also coincided with the
decline of the United States as a net exporter of capital. By the late
1980s, annual foreign direct investment in the United States nearly
equaled or exceeded annual U.S. direct investment in foreign countries.
In 1982, for example, the year the first wave of negotiations began,
the book value of foreign direct investment in the United States was
$124.7 billion, while the book value of U.S. direct investment abroad
was $207.8 billion."5 In 1989, the first year of the second wave of
negotiations, inward investment actually exceeded outward investment.
Foreign direct investment in the United States totaled $373.8 billion,
while U.S. direct investment abroad was $370.1 billion. 116
U.S. BIT policymakers during the initial formulation of the model
negotiating text and the first wave of negotiations had rarely discussed
the extent to which BIT provisions might hinder U.S. treatment of
foreign investment. In those days, BIT policy assumed a world in
which net investment flows were outward from the United States.
Accordingly, the BIT was designed to ensure the maximum protection
for private investment.
The rise of foreign direct investment in the United States during the
1980s prompted a wave of economic protectionism. The bipartisan
consensus that investment should flow freely collapsed amid calls for
restrictions on foreign direct investment in the United States. Congress
responded by enacting the Exon-Florio Amendment to permit the
screening of foreign investment." 
7
Exon-Florio, of course, was very difficult to reconcile with the
national treatment provisions of the BITs." Although the mere enact-
ment of such legislation would not necessarily violate any BIT, its
enforcement against a national or company of a BIT partner very likely
would, unless the enforcement was regarded as a measure necessary to
protect the essential security interests of the United States, or was
against investment in a sector of the economy in which the United
States had reserved the right, under some circumstances, to deny nation-
115. EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 17 (1991).
116. Id.
117. See Alvarez, supra note 107, at 56-80.
118. The national treatment provisions require each party to permit nationals and
companies of the other party to establish investment on terms no less favorable than those
accorded to its own nationals. See infra text accompanying note 133.
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al treatment." 9
As it has happened, the enactment of protectionist legislation and
the negotiation of the second wave of BITs appear to have had little
reciprocal effect. The fact that protectionist legislation was potentially
contrary to BIT obligations has had little impact on Congressional
consideration of such legislation, At the same time, the passage of the
legislation has not been reflected in the text of the BITs.
The explanation for this phenomenon perhaps rests in large part on
the distinct roles played by the President and Congress in the treaty
process and in part on the increased political significance of the BITs.
The Reagan and Bush Administrations, which were committed to free
trade, had the authority to negotiate the BITs and declined to modify the
agreements to accommodate protectionist sentiment in the Senate.
Conversely, the Senate, which has been a locus of protectionist activity
at the federal level, has refused to allow treaty obligations entered into
by the President (with Senate advice and consent) to stand in the way of
the Exon-Florio Amendment.
The Senate might have been expected during its consideration of the
BITs concluded in the second wave to question the consistency of these
agreements with a protectionist policy, but it has declined to do so.
This may be attributed to the fact that the BITs increasingly have been
seen as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, rather than simply a means
of ensuring legal protection for U.S. investment abroad.120 BITs from
the second wave were presented to the Senate in two groups. The first
group consisted of the Poland and Panama BITs, both of which were
imbued with considerable political significance and were politically
popular. The second group included the Russia BIT, which also was
symbolically important and politically popular. Thus, neither occasion
presented a suitable opportunity for protectionist elements in the Senate
to question whether the BITs were consistent with other elements of
U.S. investment policy.
D. Regionalization of Investment Policy
One of the more subtle trends in the second wave is the emerging
regionalization of foreign investment policy. At the inception of the
BIT program, U.S. policymakers sought to ensure that U.S. investors
would receive Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment with respect to the
119. Alvarez, supra note 107, at 20-40. On the essential security interests exception, see
infra text accompanying notes 509-16. On exceptions to national treatment, see infra text
accompanying notes 148-54.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 99-108.
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right to establish investment and with respect to the treatment of invest-
ment once established.'21  Whether to seek national treatment was
somewhat more controversial, but U.S. policymakers ultimately decided
in the affirmative. 22
In 1985, during the hiatus between the first and second waves, the
United States signed a free trade agreement with Israel. 2 3 Free trade
agreements with Canada"24 and with Mexico and Canada' jointly
followed in 1987 and 1992, respectively. Further, commencing with the
1987 draft, the United States inserted into every BIT language exempt-
ing from the general MFN obligation any advantage conferred by virtue
of membership in a customs union or free trade area. 26 Although a
number of pre-1987 BITs had included customs union exceptions,
127
these generally had been concessions made to other States, rather than a
U.S. sponsored exception to the general MFN obligation.
A further and potentially more sweeping derogation from the general
MFN obligation came with the 1991 draft. The 1991 and 1992 drafts
permit each State to exempt specific sectors or matters from the general
MFN obligation by listing the sector or matter in an annex to the BIT.
128
The effect could be to encourage far more deviations from MFN treat-
ment than in the past.129
Finally, a third derogation from the MFN standard appeared initially
in the Poland BIT and became part of the model negotiating text,
commencing with the 1991 draft. Specifically, the 1991 and 1992 drafts
exempt from the general MFN obligation those advantages accorded by
virtue of a party's binding obligations under multilateral agreements
within the framework of the GATT, entered into subsequent to the
BIT. 30  This language was intended to exclude investment related
121. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 72.
122. Id. The concern was that insistence on national treatment would severely limit the
number of states willing to conclude a BIT.
123. Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, April 22, 1985, U.S.-Israel,
H.R. Doc. No. 61, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 3, 24 I.L.M. 653 [hereinafter Free Trade Area
Agreement].
124. Free Trade Agreement, December 22-23, 1987 and January 2, 1988, U.S.-Can.,
H.R. Doc. No. 216, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 297, 27 I.L.M. 281.
125. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M.
289, 605 (as this article went to press, this agreement was not yet ratified by the United
States).
126. See infra text accompanying notes 152-53.
127. See infra text accompanying notes 148-51.
128. See infra text accompanying notes 189-90.
129. See infra text following note 181.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 186-88, 191-97.
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concessions made during the Uruguay Round from the general MFN
obligations.
Taken together, these modifications to the BIT model negotiating
text signal a clear move away from the original goal of establishing a
single, global standard of MFN treatment for investment. The decision
of the United States to regionalize its trade policy through the creation
of various free trade areas has led inexorably to a regionalization of
foreign investment policy. Although a general standard of MFN treat-
ment for investment remains the rule, the path has been cleared for a
proliferation of exceptions. It remains to be seen what will become of
the MFN obligation in future BITs.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODEL NEGOTIATING TEXT
This Part describes changes in the model negotiating text that have
occurred during the second wave. For purposes of comparison, section
A describes the principal provisions of the model negotiating texts used
during the first wave. As noted above, the most important texts during
the first wave were the 1983 and 1984 drafts.'
3
'
Just prior to the commencement of the second wave, U.S. BIT
negotiators completed a 1987 draft. Section B describes the more
significant changes incorporated in that draft.
Negotiations during the second wave, particularly those with Poland,
suggested the need for additional changes and thus the model negotiat-
ing text was revised again in 1991. Section C describes the more
significant changes made in the 1991 draft.
The negotiation of the Argentina BIT occasioned a marked revision
of the investor-to-State dispute provision. The revised provision along
with a couple of minor changes were incorporated into the model
negotiating text in 1992. Section D describes the changes made in
developing the 1992 draft.
A. The First Wave: The 1981-1984 Negotiating Texts
The principal provisions in the model negotiating text as it emerged
in 1981 and was modified over the next three years during the first
wave of negotiations were as follows:
RELATIVE TREATMENT STANDARDS:' 32 Required host State to permit
covered investment to be established in its territory on a national and
MFN basis, and to provide such investment, once established, with
131. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41.
132. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. I(l)-(3); 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. 11(l).
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national and MFN treatment; permitted each party to specify, in an
annex to the treaty, sectors or matters in which it reserved the right to
deny national treatment to covered investment.
ABSOLUTE TREATMENT STANDARDS: 133 Required host States to
provide covered investment with the most constant protection and
security and with treatment no less favorable than that required by
international law; prohibited impairment of -investment activity by
arbitrary and discriminatory measures; also required host States to
observe any contractual obligations into which they had entered with
respect to investment.
PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS:' 34 Prohibited host States from
establishing performance requirements, such as requirements to use local
sources of supply or to export products, as a condition of investment.
ENTRY AND SOJOURN: 135 Entitled investors of one party to enter the
territory of the other party for investment-related purposes, subject to the
other party's immigration laws.
EMPLOYMENT: 136 Granted to nationals and companies of one party
the right to hire the top managerial personnel of their choice in the
territory of the other party.
JUDICIAL ACCESS: 137 Guaranteed to covered investors effective means
of asserting claims against the host State in the courts of the host State.
PUBLICATION:' 38 Required each party to make public laws and
regulations pertaining to foreign investment.
INFORMATION EXCHANGE: 139 Although this provision was omitted
from the 1984 draft, earlier drafts required each party to endeavor to
establish procedures for the exchange of information concerning invest-
ments of nationals and companies of the other party.
TAXATION: '° Excluded taxation matters from BIT coverage, except
for the obligations with respect to expropriation, free transferability of
currency, and disputes involving an investment agreement or authoriza-
tion.
EXPROPRIATION:1 4' Prohibited expropriation of covered investment
133. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. 11(4); 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. I1(2).
134. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. 11(7); 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. 11(5).
135. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. 11 (5)(a); 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. 11 (3).
136. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. II (5)(b); 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. 11 (4).
137. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. 11(8); 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. 11(6).
138. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. 11(9); 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. 11(7).
139. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. VI(2).
140. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. XI; 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. XI.
141. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. HI(I); 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. 111(1).
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unless the expropriation was nondiscriminatory, for a public purpose, in
accordance with due process of law, accompanied by prompt, adequate,
and effective compensation, and not inconsistent with any contractual
obligation.
CURRENCY TRANSFERS:' 42 Guaranteed to investors the right to
transfer payments related to an investment into and out of the host State
freely and without delay.
INVESTOR-TO-STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: 143 Guaranteed to inves-
tors the right to binding, third-party arbitration of investment disputes
with the host State under the auspices of ICSID. Early drafts provided
that disputes were to be submitted to any previously-agreed disputes
procedures and, once so submitted, no longer were within the investor-
to-State dispute provision of the BIT. The 1983 and 1984 drafts provid-
ed that disputes were excluded from the arbitration provision of the BIT
only if the investor elected to use previously-agreed dispute procedures.
STATE-TO-STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:'4 Guaranteed to each party
the right to binding, third-party arbitration of disputes with the other
party involving the interpretation or application of the BIT.
NONPRECLUDED MEASURES: 14 5 Exempted from BIT obligations any
measures necessary to maintain the public order, to protect a State's
essential security interests, or to fulfill a State's obligations involving
the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security.
PRESERVATION OF RIGHTS:' 46 Provided that the BIT would not
derogate from prior legislation, treaties or investment agreements grant-
ing covered investment treatment more favorable than that required by
the BIT.
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 147 The 1983 draft stated explicitly that the
BIT applied to political subdivisions of the parties. The 1984 draft was
silent on this point, assuming that it was implicit.
B. The 1987 Model Negotiating Text
The second wave of BITs, the negotiation of which began in early
1989, was based on a 1987 draft, and, later, 1991 and 1992 drafts of the
model negotiating text. This section discusses significant changes in the
142. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. V(1); 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. IV(1).
143. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. VII; 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. VI.
144. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. VIII; 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. VII.
145. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. X(I); 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. X(I).
146. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. IX; 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. IX.
147. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. XII.
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model text that appeared in the 1987 draft. The next two sections
discuss significant changes that appeared in the 1991 and 1992 drafts,
respectively. Unless otherwise noted, changes that appeared in the 1987
draft were carried forward into the 1991 draft and changes that appeared
in either the 1987 or the 1991 draft were carried forward into the 1992
draft.
1. Customs Unions
During the first wave of BITs, Egypt, 148 Morocco,'49 Bangladesh, 5°
and Haiti'' had successfully negotiated for the inclusion of provisions
authorizing a limited exception to the requirement that covered invest-
ment be provided MFN treatment by the host State. The exception
applied to any advantage afforded to investors of a third State by virtue
of the host State's membership in a customs union or free trade area.
As a matter of policy, U.S. BIT negotiators always had been pre-
pared to accommodate customs unions and free trade areas. During the
negotiation of the first wave of BITs, however, the United States be-
longed to neither a customs union nor a free trade area. Thus, accom-
modating language was necessary only if a particular BIT partner
belonged or hoped to belong to such an arrangement.
Nevertheless, as a reflection of both the general willingness of the
United States to include a customs union exception, and the large
number of States that sought one in negotiations, U.S. BIT negotiators
inserted into the 1987 draft a provision, at article 11(9), which exempts
from the general MFN obligations of the treaty any advantages afforded
to nationals and companies of a third country by virtue of the host
State's "binding obligations that derive from full membership in a
regional customs union or free trade area." The word "regional" was
dropped from subsequent drafts of the model negotiating text.
The inclusion of the customs union exception also may have drawn
some impetus from the fact that in 1985 the United States concluded a
free trade agreement with Israel.15 2 The Israeli Free Trade Agreement,
however, contained no investment provisions and thus did not necessi-
tate the inclusion of a customs union exception in the BITs. In 1987,
the United States entered into a second free trade agreement with
148. Egypt BIT, supra note 42, Protocol, para. 4.
149. Morocco BIT, supra note 44, Protocol, para. 2(a).
150. Bangladesh BIT, supra note 47, Protocol, para. 2.
151. Haiti BIT, supra note 49, art. 11(12).
152. Free Trade Area Agreement, supra note 123.
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Canada, which did include a limited set of investment provisions.' 53 In
addition, as this article goes to press, negotiators for the United States,
Canada, and Mexico have reached agreement on the North American
Free Trade Agreement, which contains more extensive investment
provisions.'-'
2. Previously-Agreed Dispute Procedures
The 1987 draft language explicitly states that the investor has the
right to invoke the investor-to-State dispute mechanism in the BIT,
notwithstanding the specification of other dispute resolution mechanisms
in a prior agreement between the investor and the host State. At the
inception of the BIT program, U.S. policymakers believed that the BIT's
investor-to-State dispute mechanism should not displace any previously-
agreed disputes mechanism. Accordingly, early model negotiating drafts
had required that investment disputes be submitted to previously-agreed
procedures and provided that the BIT's investor-to-State dispute mecha-
nism could be invoked only if the dispute had not been submitted to any
such previously-agreed procedures and six months had elapsed since the
dispute arose.55
Under these early drafts, an investor theoretically still could use the
investor-to-State dispute mechanism in the BITs, despite the existence of
other previously-agreed procedures. The investor simply needed to
decline to invoke any previously-agreed procedures and then submit the
dispute to ICSID after six months had elapsed. The host State, howev-
er, could cut off the right to ICSID arbitration by invoking previously-
agreed procedures. Beginning with the 1983 draft, U.S. BIT negotiators
decided that investors should have the right to invoke the BIT's inves-
tor-to-State dispute procedures, regardless of the existence of other
previously-agreed procedures.'56 The 1983 and 1984 drafts thus were
revised to provide that the right to ICSID arbitration was lost only if the
investor submitted the dispute to previously-agreed procedures.1
57
This revision still left room for misinterpretation because the BITs
continued to state that previously-agreed dispute procedures "shall" be
used. The 1987 draft corrected the situation by providing explicitly that
the obligation to use previously-agreed procedures is subordinate to the
153. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 124.
154. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 125.
155. See, e.g., 1982 draft, supra note 35, art.VII(3)(a).
156. VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 167.
157. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. VII(3)(a); 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. VI(3)(a).
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investor's right to invoke the investor-to-State dispute mechanism.'
The 1987 draft, then, does not change the approach followed in the
1983 and 1984 drafts, but only clarifies the language.
3. State-to-State Dispute Provision
The State-to-State dispute provision of the early BIT model negotiat-
ing texts' 59 had provided for arbitration in accordance with the Model
Rules on Arbitral Procedures, adopted by the United Nations Interna-
tional Law Commission in 1958.' 60 The 1987 draft provides for arbitra-
tion in accordance with the Arbitration Rules 161 of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 62 The UNCI-
TRAL Rules, as modified, had been used successfully by the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal during the 1980s, a fact which influenced
their eventual adoption in the BITs. In any event, the BITs provide
explicitly that the parties may adopt other rules by mutual agreement. 163
The adoption of the UNCITRAL rules in the 1987 draft led to one
other change, with respect to the appointing authority. All BIT model
negotiating texts had anticipated the problem of one party's refusing
either to appoint the arbitrator it is allowed to appoint or to replace an
arbitrator who has resigned or become incapacitated. The 1983 draft
had specified that in such an event, a party could request the President
of the International Court of Justice to designate an appointing authority
to make the necessary appointment.' 64 The 1983 draft language, howev-
er, had been unnecessary because the matter was covered in virtually
identical language in the ILC Model Rules,'165 which governed State-to-
State arbitration under that draft. Accordingly, as part of its
streamlining of the BITs, the 1984 draft omitted any reference to the
appointing authority.' 66
The UNCITRAL Rules adopted by the 1987 draft provide for
158. 1987 draft, supra note 38, art. VI(2).
159. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. VIII(8); 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. VII(I).
160. MODEL RULES ON ARBITRAL PROCEDURE, reprinted in 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 239
(1959) [hereinafter ILC MODEL RULES].
161. U.N. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, DECISION ON UNCITRAL RULES,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/IX/CRP.4/Add. 1, amended by U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SR. 178 (1976), reprinted
in 15 I.L.M. 701 (1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL RULES].
162. 1987 draft, supra note 38, art. VII(I).
163. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. VIII(8); 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. VII(I); 1987
draft, supra note 38, art. VII(I).
164. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. VIII(4).
165. ILC MODEL RULES, supra note 160, art. 3(2).
166. 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. VII.
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designation of an appointing authority by the Secretary General of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration.167 In the aftermath of the United States'
unsuccessful defense of the Nicaragua case before the International
Court of Justice, the fact that the UNCITRAL rules designated an
official other than the President of the Court as the appointing authority
may have seemed to some in the Reagan administration to be another
reason to prefer the UNCITRAL Rules over the ILC Model Rules. The
1987 draft rejected even the reference to the Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration and provides instead that the appointing authority is to be the
Secretary General of ICSID.'68
4. Jurisdictional Limitation on Nonprecluded Measures
The 1987 draft corrects what appears to have been an unwise
drafting decision made during the preparation of the 1984 draft. The
change appears in the nonprecluded measures provision, which excludes
from BIT obligations any measure necessary to further a party's own
essential security interests.
The 1984 draft had modified this language to apply only to mea-
sures "in [the party's] jurisdiction."' 169 This modification appears to have
been a reaction to concerns by various potential BIT partners that the
essential security interests exception might be used by the United States
as a legal justification for intervening in the internal affairs of a BIT
partner. Indeed, Zaire, 170 Cameroon,' 7 1 and Morocco 172 all had success-
fully negotiated the inclusion of language in their BITs that limited the
entire nonprecluded measures provision to measures taken in a party's
own territory.
As an initial matter, the concern was largely misplaced. The
nonprecluded measures provision does not affirmatively authorize
conduct of any kind. It merely provides that certain measures, other-
wise potentially prohibited by the BIT, shall not be prohibited. That is,
it is not an authorization, but a limitation on a prohibition.
In any event, the United States sought a way to address these
concerns other than through the approach used in the Zaire, Cameroon,
and Morocco BITs. To the United States, the jurisdictional limitation
seemed advantageous because a State's jurisdiction often exceeds its
territory and thus "measures within its jurisdiction" was a broader
formulation than "measures within its territory." At the same time, the
167. UNCITRAL RULES, supra note 161, arts. 6, 7.
168. 1987 draft, supra note 38, art. VII(2).
169. 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. X(1).
170. Zaire BIT, supra note 45, art. X(1).
171. Cameroon BIT, supra note 46, art. X(1).
172. Morocco BIT, supra note 44, art. IX(I).
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jurisdictional limitation had the virtue of acknowledging in some way
the concern of many States about territorial intervention.
The problem with the jurisdictional limitation lay in its potential to
cause confusion. The extent of a State's extraterritorial jurisdiction
remains a subject of controversy in contemporary international law.'7 3
The question whether a particular action was permitted by the non-
precluded measures provision would turn on whether the action was
within the State's jurisdiction, an issue which easily could become
entangled in the modern debate over the scope of extraterritorial juris-
diction. Because the BIT generally protects investment only if it is in
the host State's territory, action taken by the host State which impairs
covered investment usually will be considered action taken within the
host State's territory and thus, by even the most conservative measure of
jurisdiction, within its jurisdiction. Situations may arise, however,
where actions taken within the host State's territory have extraterritorial
consequences, leading to questions concerning whether such measures
were within the host State's jurisdiction and thus within the scope of the
nonprecluded measures provision. Fortunately, the jurisdictional limita-
tion was deleted from the 1987 draft.
74
5. Political Subdivisions
U.S. BIT negotiators have vacillated in the way in which they seek
to address the applicability of the BIT to political subdivisions, although
the underlying intent has not changed. The underlying intent of the
drafters is that substantive protections afforded by the BIT govern the
conduct of BIT parties and their political subdivisions. 75  Thus, an
uncompensated expropriation of covered investment by one of the fifty
states would violate the BIT to the same extent as an identical expropri-
ation by the United States government. Further, the BIT parties are
responsible for individual violations of BIT rules by their political
subdivisions. 76 Thus, a covered investor injured by a treaty violation by
one of the fifty states could invoke any of the remedies created by the
BIT against the U.S. government.
One question that arose was whether the BIT remedies also could be
173. See, e.g., Mark B. Feldman, The Restructuring of National Security Controls under
the 1985 Amendments to the Export Administration Act: Multilateral Diplomacy and the
External Application of United States Law, 21 STAN. J. INT'L L. 235 (1985); Carl A. Cira, Jr.,
The Challenge of Foreign Laws to Block American Antitrust Actions, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L.
247 (1982).
174. 1987 draft, supra note 38, art. X(1).
175. VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 62.
176. Id.
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invoked against the political subdivisions. The BIT drafters did not
intend to require or to authorize political subdivisions to be parties to
international arbitration under the BIT.177  Indeed, the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the arbitral
mechanism used in the investor-to-State dispute provision of most of the
BITs, does not permit arbitrations involving political subdivisions unless
the State has specially notified ICSID. 178  In short, the BIT model
negotiating texts were drafted on the assumption that BIT violations by
a party or its political subdivision would be remedied by an arbitration
against the party itself.
In the early drafts, the applicability of the BIT to political subdivi-
sions was addressed by article XII, which provided that "[t]his Treaty
shall apply to political subdivisions of the Parties."' 179 This article was
eliminated from the 1984 draft as superfluous. U.S. BIT negotiators
thought better of that decision in preparing the 1987 draft and reinserted
article XII in a slightly modified form. The 1987 language provides
that "[t]his Treaty shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to the political subdivi-
sions of the Parties." The phrase "mutatis mutandis" makes clear that
the manner in which the BIT applies to political subdivisions varies with
context. In addition, the clause was formulated specifically with the
problem of remedies in mind.180 Only the Grenada BIT was based in its
entirety on the 1984 draft and thus, only the Grenada BIT omits any
reference to political subdivisions.
C. The 1991 Model Negotiating Text
The 1991 draft includes a number of minor changes from prior
drafts. There was minor tinkering, for example, with several of the
definitions of terms in article I.1' Three changes, however, are note-
worthy.
1. Arbitrary and Discriminatory Measures
The model negotiating texts prior to 1991 had prohibited impairing
177. Id.
178. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, Aug. 27, 1965, art. 25(3), 17 U.S.T. 1280.
179. See, e.g., 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. XII.
180. VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 62.
181. The most noteworthy may have been the explicit inclusion of certain forms of
intellectual property within the definition of investment. See 1991 draft, supra note 39, art.
I(1)(a)(iv). The definition of investment in prior drafts had included fewer references to
specific types of intellectual property.
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"by arbitrary and discriminatory measures the management, operation,
maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, expansion, or disposal" of
covered investment. 8 2 The 1991 draft inserted a new sentence which
provides that "[f]or purposes of dispute resolution under Articles VI and
VII, a measure may be arbitrary and discriminatory notwithstanding the
fact that a party has had or has exercised the opportunity to review such
measure in the courts or administrative tribunals of a Party.'
183
This sentence was added in response to the decision of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A.
(ELSI).)' In that case, the United States had alleged that the requisi-
tioning by the Mayor of Palermo of an Italian subsidiary of an Ameri-
can company was an "arbitrary or discriminatory" measure in violation
of the FCN treaty between the United States and Italy. In rejecting the
U.S. argument, the Court observed with respect to the requisition order
that:
here was an act belonging to a category of public acts from which
appeal on juridical grounds was provided in law (and indeed in the
event used, not without success). Thus, the Mayor's order was con-
sciously made in the context of an operating system of law and of
appropriate remedies of appeal, and treated as such by the superior
administrative authority and local courts. These are not at all the marks
of an "arbitrary" act. 8
The United States was concerned that, as a result of this decision, an
arbitral panel formed pursuant to the investor-to-State or State-to-State
dispute procedures of the BIT might conclude that the act of a host
State which impaired investment was not an arbitrary and discriminatory
act in violation of the BIT, because the act was subject to review or
appeal under local law. Such an interpretation, of course, would rob the
prohibition on arbitrary and discriminatory measures of much of its
force. Accordingly, the new language was inserted into the 1991 draft
to preclude a tribunal from deciding that a host State act subject to
appeal ipsofacto could not be an arbitrary and discriminatory act within
the meaning of the BIT.
2. The GATT Exception
The 1991 draft includes a new provision, at article II(9)(b), which
provides that the MFN obligations imposed by the BIT shall not apply
182. See, e.g., 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. 11(2); 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. 11(a).
183. 1991 draft, supra note 39, art. II(2)(b).
184. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A., [hereinafter ELSI] (U.S.v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20).
185. Id.
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to advantages accorded by virtue of a party's binding obligations under
any multilateral agreement within the framework of the GATT, entered
into subsequent to the BIT.'8 6  The inclusion of this language was
prompted by a concern that the general MFN language would grant to
BIT partners investment-related concessions made by the United States
in multilateral agreements resulting from the Uruguay Round of GATT
negotiations, without those partners having to adhere to such agree-
ments. The BITs thus could undercut to some extent any progress made
at the Uruguay Round.
This language had first appeared in the Poland BIT,8 7 probably
because that BIT, unlike the others, covered trade as well as investment,
and because it was the first BIT to have been entirely negotiated after
the commencement of the Uruguay Round.188 In preparing the 1991
draft, U.S. negotiators decided to incorporate the Poland BIT's language
into the model negotiating text for future BITs.
3. Restructuring the Annex
The model negotiating texts prior to 1991 had permitted the parties
at the time each BIT was signed to specify sectors of their economies in
which they reserved the right to deny national treatment to covered
investment. 8 9 In addition, they had exempted ownership of real estate
and mining on the public domain from the MFN obligations of the BIT
in order to accommodate U.S. federal and state laws on these subjects."9
The 1991 draft bifurcated the annex so that it contains separate
paragraphs for those sectors of the economy in which national treatment
may be denied and those sectors in which MFN treatment may be
denied. The real estate and mining exemptions were moved to the
annex where they appear as sectors exempt from MFN treatment.
The change, at first glance, seems merely to simplify the treaty text
by moving some exceptions from the main text to the annex, and this
appears to have been the initial impetus for the restructuring. Unfortu-
nately, however, it could have the effect of encouraging more departures
from MFN treatment. Under prior model negotiating texts, MFN
treatment was required even in the sectors listed in the annex. Thus a
186. See 1991 draft, supra note 39, art. II(9)(b).
187. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. XII(2)(b).
188. See infra text accompanying notes 255-65.
189. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. 11(3); 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. 11(1); 1987 draft,
supra note 38, art. II(1).
190. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. 11(3); 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. 11(1); 1987 draft,
supra note 38, art. II(1).
[Vol. 14:621
U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties
BIT partner could exempt a sector from MFN treatment only by negoti-
ating for a specific exception. The contents of the annex, on the other
hand, generally are established by the unilateral declaration of each
party prior to the signing of the BIT. Although the United States
presumably would refuse to sign a BIT with a State that wished to
reserve the right to exempt an excessive number of sectors from the
BIT's MFN obligations, the 1991 draft's approach does make it possible
for BIT partners to exempt at least some sectors from MFN as well as
national treatment by unilaterally placing them in the annex, without
having to negotiate for a specific exception.
D. The 1992 Model Negotiating Text
The 1992 draft incorporates stylistic improvements made in three
areas: (1) the GATT exception; (2) the provision for transfer of expro-
priation compensation; and (3) the investor-to-State dispute provision.
1. The GATT Exception
The 1991 draft provided that the GATT exception' 9' applied to
multilateral agreements "entered into subsequent to this Agreement.''
92
It was unclear under this language whether "entered into" referred to the
signature of the agreements or their entry into force. The 1992 draft
clarifies the language by providing that the GATT exception applies to
any multilateral international agreement under the framework of the
GATT that "enters into force subsequent to the signature of this treaty."
The ambiguity in the 1991 draft language was caught early by BIT
negotiators. Thus, the 1991 language appears in only two BITs: those
with the Czech and the Slovak Republics. 93 Of the remaining BITs
negotiated from the 1991 draft, the Sri Lanka 94 and Bulgaria 195 BITs
use the 1992 draft language, while the Russia BIT uses a unique formu-
lation, 96 and the Argentina BIT omits the provision entirely.
97
2. Transfer of Expropriation Compensation
The expropriation article of the 1991 draft required that compensa-
191. See supra text accompanying notes 186-88.
192. 1991 draft, supra note 39, art. II (9)(b).
193. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. II (9)(b).
194. Sri Lanka BIT, supra note 72, art. II (9)(b).
195. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. II (9)(b).
196. See infra text accompanying notes 481-84.
197. See infra text accompanying note 540.
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tion for expropriation "be freely transferable at the prevailing market
rate of exchange on the date of expropriation." '' 9 This formulation was
criticized because, as a practical matter, compensation would be trans-
ferred at the exchange rate in effect on the date of transfer. Thus, the
language misstated the actual mechanics of the transfer process.
The 1991 draft language, in essence, had sought to establish that the
investor should not bear the risk of a change in the exchange rate.
Accordingly, compensation should be calculated in such a way that,
when the compensation is converted to a freely usable currency at the
exchange rate in effect on the date of transfer, the investor will receive
the same amount of new currency as it would have received had the
transfer occurred on the date of expropriation.
The 1992 draft makes this principle explicit. It requires that expro-
priation compensation be "calculated in any freely usable currency on
the basis of the prevailing market rate of exchange at that time.""' By
calculating compensation in this way, the investor receives the amount
of freely usable currency that it would have received had transfer
occurred on the date of expropriation, even though the transfer will be
carried out at the rate of exchange on the date of transfer. In essence,
the compensation amount is adjusted to prevent loss to the investor
attributable to a change in the exchange rate.
The transfers article of the 1991 draft had provided that transfers of
payments related to an investment generally must occur at the prevailing
market rate of exchange on the date of transfer.' This was inconsistent
with the expropriation compensation provision, and thus the transfers
article had exempted expropriation compensation from this provision.
The principle was that expropriation compensation be calculated based
on the rate of exchange in effect on the date of expropriation while all
other payments related to an investment be transferred at the rate of
exchange in effect on the date of transfer. Because the new language in
the expropriation compensation provision of the 1992 draft indicates that
expropriation compensation shall be transferred using the exchange rate
on the date of transfer, it no longer was necessary to exclude the
expropriation compensation provision from the general language of the
transfers provision. Thus, the 1992 draft omitted the exclusionary
language.
198. 1991 draft, supra note 39, art. 111(l).
199. 1992 draft, supra note 40, art. IV(2).
200. 1991 draft, supra note 39, art. IV(2).
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3. Investor-to-State Dispute Provision
The 1992 draft includes a number of stylistic and substantive chang-
es to the investor-to-State dispute provision of the 1991 draft. As an
initial matter, the definition of an investment dispute is broadened
slightly. The 1991 draft defined an investment dispute as a dispute
"involving" the "interpretation or application" of an investment agree-
ment or authorization. 2°' The 1992 draft defines it as a dispute "arising
out of or relating to an investment agreement or authorization," a
formulation which seems somewhat more inclusive.cu
The 1992 draft improves on its predecessors in its description of the
process of selecting dispute resolution mechanisms. The 1991 draft had
provided that, in the event of an investment dispute, the investor and the
host State "shall" initially seek to resolve it by "consultation and negoti-
ation, which may include the use of non-binding, third-party proce-
dures." The 1992 draft softens this language by stating that the parties
"should" seek resolution through consultation and negotiation. 3 The
reference to nonbinding third-party procedures was dropped as unneces-
sary, a change that had been anticipated in the Morocco BIT.204
In the event that the dispute could not be resolved through consulta-
tions or negotiations, the 1991 draft provided that the dispute "shall" be
submitted in accordance with previously-agreed applicable dispute
settlement procedures,2 5 subject to article VI(3), which gave the investor
the right to submit the dispute for arbitration before ICSID, notwith-
standing the existence of previously-agreed procedures, provided that the
investor had not already invoked such previously-agreed procedures.
The 1992 draft states in far less elliptical terms the choices available to
the investor. It provides that in the event that the dispute cannot be
resolved amicably, the investor "may choose" to submit the dispute to
local remedies in the host State, to applicable previously-agreed dispute
settlement procedures, or to the dispute procedures specified in article
VI(3 ).2°6 The 1992 draft avoids using the word "shall" because the BIT
201. Id. art. VI(1).
202. 1992 draft, supra note 40, art. VI(1). In the 1991 draft, the definition of an
investment dispute also includes a dispute "involving" an "alleged breach of a right conferred
or created" by the BIT. 1991 draft, supra note 39, art. VI(I). The 1992 draft definition
includes a dispute "arising out of or relating to an alleged breach" of any such right. 1992
draft, supra note 40, art. VI(1).
203. 1992 draft, supra note 40, art. VI(2).
204. Morocco BIT, supra note 44, art. VI.
205. 1991 draft, supra note 39, art. VI(2).
206. 1992 draft, supra note 40, art. VI(2).
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does not actually require the use of previously-agreed procedures. It
also states explicitly that the choice among local remedies, previously-
agreed procedures, and the BIT dispute mechanism is to be made by the
investor, a point that was only implicit in prior drafts.
The 1992 draft omits a stabilization clause which provided that, in
the event of an expropriation, any dispute settlement provision in a
previously existing agreement remained final and binding.2 7 Given that
the 1992 draft, like the 1991 draft,2" contains a separate clause obligat-
ing each party to observe any obligations it may have entered into with
regard to investments,' the stabilization clause was redundant. The
omission thus is without substantive significance. The same omission
occurs in the Zaire BIT.210
The 1991 draft made two dispute resolution mechanisms potentially
avail'able to an investor: arbitration before ICSID or ad hoc arbitration
using the ICSID rules. 211 Either was available, provided that the inves-
tor had not submitted the dispute to local remedies or previously-agreed
dispute settlement procedures, and six months had elapsed since the
dispute arose.
The 1992 draft modifies this menu of choices to include: (1) arbitra-
tion before ICSID; (2) arbitration before the Additional Facility;212 (3)
ad hoc arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL); or (4)
arbitration before any other arbitration institution or in accordance with
any other arbitration rules to which the parties to the dispute mutually
agree. The reference to the Additional Facility had appeared in the
1983213 and 1984214 drafts, but had disappeared in 1987, only to reappear
in the 1992 draft. The substitution of ad hoc arbitration under the
UNCITRAL rules for ad hoc arbitration under the ICSID rules marked
a change in U.S. practice. It is likely this change was influenced by the
successful experience of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal with the
207. See 1991 draft, supra note 39, art. VI(2).
208. Id. art. II(2)(c).
209. 1992 draft, supra note 40, art. II(2)(c).
210. Zaire BIT, supra note 45, art. VII.
211. 1991 draft, supra note 39, art. VI(3)(a).
212. The Additional Facility was created by ICSID in 1978 to serve as a mechanism for
resolving certain types of disputes outside ICSID's jurisdiction under the ICSID Convention.
The rules of the Additional Facility are set forth in ICSID, Additional Facility, Doc. No.
ICSID/II (1979), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1443 (1982) [hereinafter ADDITIONAL FACILITY
RULES].
213. 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. VII(3)(a).
214. 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. VI(3)(a).
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UNCITRAL rules, and by concerns on the part of some investors that
the efficacy of ICSID awards could be undercut by annulment proceed-
ings in local courts. This same set of four arbitration mechanisms
originally appeared in the Poland BIT,215 and, prior to the 1992 draft,
also appeared in BITs with Argentina," 6 the Czech and Slovak Repub-
lics,217 Russia,218 and Bulgaria.219
In theory, the investor selects its preferred dispute resolution mecha-
nism by consenting in writing to one of them. Once such consent has
been given, either party may invoke the appropriate mechanism. In
practice, however, not all of the mechanisms may be available to an
investor. Arbitration before ICSID is available only if the host state is a
party to the ICSID Convention, while the fourth mechanism - arbitra-
tion before an institution or under rules mutually agreed upon -
obviously is available only if the parties reach some further agreement.
As in the case of the 1991 draft, 220 the 1992 draft constitutes the
host State's consent to the investor-to-State dispute settlement mecha-
nisms specified in the BIT. 2 In addition, the 1992 draft contains new
language222 specifying that the consent of the host State set forth in the
BIT, together with the investor's written consent, shall satisfy the
requirement for written consent of the parties under the ICSID Conven-
tion 223 and the Additional Facility224 rules, as well as constituting an
agreement in writing for purposes of the New York Convention. 25 This
provision makes explicit that which had been implicit in prior BITs.
The 1992 draft includes a few provisions necessitated by the broad-
ening of the menu of arbitration procedures available under the investor-
to-State dispute article. The ICSID Convention includes clauses relating
to the finality and the enforcement of awards that may not be present in
other arbitral conventions or rules. U.S. BIT negotiators sought to
ensure that investors who selected an arbitral mechanism not subject to
215. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. IX(3)(a).
216. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. VII(3)(a).
217. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. VII(3)(a).
218. Russia BIT, supra note 71, art. VI(3)(a).
219. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VI(3)(a).
220. 1991 draft, supra note 39, art. VI(3)(a).
221. 1992 draft, supra note 40, art. VI(4).
222. Id
223. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of Other States, March 18, 1968, art. 25, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter the ICSID Convention].
224. Additional Facility Rules, supra note 203, art. 2, 4.
225. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, art. II, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention].
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the ICSID Convention would have a final, enforceable award. They did
this by incorporating counterparts to the ICSID clauses into BIT provi-
sions.
The first such provision requires that any arbitration, other than that
before ICSID, be held in a State that is a party to the New York Con-
vention.226 Some States will not enforce awards under the New York
Convention unless the arbitration was conducted in a State that is a
party to the Convention.27  This provision, thus, is intended to ensure
enforceability of the arbitral award. The provision does not apply to
arbitration before ICSID because ICSID awards are enforceable under
the ICSID Convention.228 Prior to the 1992 draft, similar language had
appeared in the BITs with Haiti, 229 Poland,2 0 the Czech and Slovak
Republics, 23' Russia,232 Argentina, 233 and Bulgaria.
231
A second such provision requires that any award rendered pursuant
to the investor-to-State dispute article be final and binding on the parties
to the dispute.235 ICSID awards are final and binding under the ICSID
Convention.236
A third provision states that each party to the BIT undertakes to
carry out without delay the provisions of the award.237 This language
would not seem strictly necessary, given that the obligation to comply
with an award is implicit in the consent to binding arbitration. An
obligation to comply with ICSID awards is contained in the ICSID
Convention.238 Prior to the 1992 draft, similar language had appeared in
the BITs with Panama, 239 Haiti,24 Bulgaria,24 the Czech and Slovak
226. 1992 draft, supra note 40, art. VI(5).
227. The United States, for example, included this condition in its instrument of
accession. See 9 U.S.C.§ 201 (1988).
228. ICSID Convention, supra note 223, art. 54(1).
229. Haiti BIT, supra note 49, art. VII(3)(d).
230. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. IX(3)(d).
231. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. VI(3)(d).
232. Russia BIT, supra note 71, art. VI(3)(d).
233. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. VII(5).
234. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VI(3)(d).
235. 1992 draft, supra note 40, art. VI(6).
236. ICSID Convention, supra note 223, art. 53(1).
237. 1992 draft, supra note 40, art. VI(6).
238. ICSID Convention, supra note 223, art. 53(1).
239. Panama BIT, supra note 43, art. VII(3)(d) (The Panama BIT omits the language
calling upon the parties to carry out the award without delay).
240. Haiti BIT, supra note 49, art. VII(3)(d) (The Haiti BIT omits the language calling
upon the parties to carry out the award without delay).
241. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VI(3)(e).
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Republics, 242 Poland, 3 Russia,244 and Argentina.2 5
A fourth provision requires that each party to the BIT provide for
the enforcement in its territory of any award rendered pursuant to the
investor-to-State disputes article. With respect to ICSID awards, the
ICSID Convention provides that each party to the Convention shall
"enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its
territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State."'
Prior to the 1992 draft, similar language had appeared in the BITs with
Panama,' 7 Haiti,' Bulgaria,2 9 the Czech and Slovak Republics, 250
Poland,2"' Russia,252 and Argentina.253
IV. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE BITs IN THE SECOND WAVE
All of the signed BITs in the second wave are based on the 1987,
1991, or 1992 drafts of the model negotiating text. This Part identifies
the particular draft on which each of the signed BITs in the second
wave was based and analyzes the principal modifications to that draft
that were made in the course of negotiating the treaty.
A. Congo
As has been described, the Congo BIT was negotiated in its entirety
during a State visit by a Congolese delegation in 1 9 9 0 .21 It is identical
in every respect to the 1987 draft of the model negotiating text.
B. Poland
The Poland BIT follows the 1987 draft with numerous minor chang-
es that have been analyzed elsewhere.2 55 The more significant changes
are noted below.
242. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. VI(3)(e).
243. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. IX (3)(e).
244. Russia BIT, supra note 71, art. VI(3)(e).
245. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. VII(6).
246. ICSID Convention, supra note 223, art. 54(1).
247. Panama BIT, supra note 43, art. VII(3)(d).
248. Haiti BIT, supra note 49, art. VII(3)(d).
249. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VI(3)(e).
250. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. VI(3)(e).
251. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. IX(3)(e).
252. Russia BIT, supra note 71, art. VI(3)(e).
253. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. VI(6).
254. See supra text accompanying note 104.
255. See, e.g., VANDEVELDE, supra note 1.
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1. Commercial Activity
The Poland BIT differs from all other BITs in that it protects
commercial activity, as well as investment. The FCN agreements, of
course, had been directed principally at trade relations, with investment
protection becoming a primary purpose only after the Second World
War, when the GATT became the primary instrument of U.S. trade
policy.256 Although both Poland and the United States belong to the
GATT, U.S. BIT negotiators nevertheless decided to incorporate some
provisions on trade into the Poland BIT.
In some instances, commercial activity is protected simply by
adding a reference to it in an investment protection provision, so that
commercial activity is protected to the same extent and in the same way
as investment. Examples of such provisions include the currency
transfers provision,257 the publications provision,258 and the taxation
provision. 9
In other instances, the Poland BIT included provisions relating
specifically to trade that paralleled very closely certain investment
protection provisions of the BIT. Thus, the Poland BIT imposes several
absolute standards on the treatment afforded to commercial activity,
such as fair and equitable treatment; the enjoyment of full protection
and security; treatment no less favorable than that required by interna-
tional law; treatment that is not arbitrary and discriminatory; and treat-
ment consistent with the contractual obligations between the BIT party
and the national or company of the other party.26° The Poland BIT also
contains a judicial access provision applicable to trade; 26' an entry and
sojourn provision for traders;262 and a provision guaranteeing MFN and
national treatment with respect to certain matters that consistently have
posed problems for those seeking to do business in Eastern Europe.263
256. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
257. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. V. For a summary of the currency transfers
provision, see supra text accompanying note 142.
258. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. VIII(2). For a summary of the publication provi-
sion, see supra text accompanying note 138.
259. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. VI. For a summary of the taxation provision, see
supra text accompanying note 140.
260. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. 111(3).
261. Id., art. 11(7). For a summary of the judicial access provision, see supra text
accompanying note 137.
262. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. 111(7). For a summary of the entry and sojourn
provision, see supra text accompanying note 135.
263. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. 111(2). For a summary of the analogous investment
related provision, see infra text accompanying notes 327-34.
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In still other instances, the Poland BIT has special trade provisions
that are unlike any specific investment protection provision. For exam-
ple, it includes a provision requiring each party to encourage the partici-
pation of its nationals in trade promotion events held in the territory of
the other party and a provision requiring each party to permit the
importation and re-export on a duty free basis of articles for use in trade
promotion events. 2"4 The Poland BIT also contains a provision endors-
ing the use of arbitration for settlement of commercial disputes and
prohibiting either party from requiring that the place of any such arbitra-
tion be in Poland or the United States.265
2. MFN and National Treatment
Under the Poland BIT, the obligation to permit investment on a
national and MFN treatment basis is "in accordance with [each party's]
relevant laws and regulations. ' 26 That is, either party may deny nation-
al or MFN treatment to nationals and companies of the other party with
respect to the right to establish or acquire investment, as long as the
denial is in accordance with local law. Provisions authorizing some
form of investment screening also appear in the BITs with Panama,267
Morocco,268 Turkey,269 Tunisia, ° the Czech and Slovak Republics,27'
and Russia.2 7
2
The Poland BIT, however, was accompanied by a side letter that
imposes additional conditions on Poland's discretion to exclude U.S.
investment. First, a permit for entry of U.S. investment must be issued
or denied within sixty days of application by the U.S. national or
company. Further, permission may be denied only if the investment
presents a threat to State economic interests, national security, or the
environment. The denial of permission must be accompanied by a
written statement of the reasons for denial. The standards for evaluating
environmental impact must be the same as those applied to domestic
enterprises, while the criterion of a threat to State economic interests
may be used only in "exceptional cases" and never for the purpose of
264. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. 111(1).
265. Id. art. 111(6).
266. Id. art. 11(1).
267. Panama BIT, supra note 43, art. II(1)(2).
268. Morocco BIT, supra note 44, art. II(1).
269. Turkey BIT, supra note 50, art. 11(1).
270. Tunisia BIT, supra note 73, art. II(1).
271. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, Exchange of Letters (Oct. 22, 1991).
272. Russia BIT, supra note 71, Protocol, para. 4.
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limiting competition. U.S. nationals and companies, moreover, are to
receive MFN treatment with respect to the implementation of these
procedures. A somewhat similar set of provisions appears in the BITs
with Russia273 and the Czech and Slovak Republics.274
Poland and the United States also agreed that, within two years of
the entry into force of the Poland BIT, the two parties would review
these provisions on entry of investment with a view toward narrowing
the category of investments subject to the provisions and ultimately
eliminating them completely. Polish negotiators told U.S. negotiators
that screening provisions, even at the time of negotiations, resulted in
the exclusion of investment "only very rarely." 275
The annex to the Poland BIT contains an especially large number of
sectors or matters excluded from the various national and MFN treat-
ment provisions of that treaty. In recognition of that fact, the Poland
BIT contains language reaffirming Poland's intention to eliminate the
State monopoly with respect to many of the sectors or matters listed in
the annex and, ultimately, to remove the sectors or matters from the
annex entirely.276
On the other hand, the annex also reserved to Poland the right until
December 31, 1992, to add sectors or matters to the annex.277 The
model negotiating texts had not permitted the parties to add sectors or
matters to the annex once the treaty was signed, except by treaty amend-
ment. The Poland BIT does impose three conditions on Poland's right
to make additions to the annex.278 First, any additions to the annex must
be kept to a minimum. Second, any additions may not significantly
impair investment or commercial279 opportunities for U.S. nationals and
companies. Third, any addition to the annex shall not apply to invest-
ment or associated activities in existence at the time the modification to
the annex becomes effective.
3. Judicial Access
The Poland BIT modified the language of the judicial access provi-
273. Id.
274. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, Exchange of Letters (Oct. 22, 1991).
275. Poland BIT, supra note 62, Letter of Submittal (from Deputy Secretary of State
Lawrence Eagleburger to President George Bush).
276. Id. Annex, para. 4.
277. Id. Annex, para. 7.
278. Id
279. The Poland BIT is unique among the BITs in that it covers commercial as well as
investment matters.
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sionu0 in a way that is consistent with its general tolerance of invest-
ment screening by Poland.28' Specifically, the Poland BIT omits denials
of investment authorizations from the scope of the judicial access
provision. Thus, Poland has reserved the right to make denials of
investment authorizations nonreviewable in Polish courts. To the extent
that a denial of an investment authorization violates the BIT, however, it




The Poland BIT's currency transfers provision differs from that of
the 1987 draft in that it protects transfers "related to an investment [or]
commercial activity, 283 rather than simply transfers related to an invest-
ment. This reflects the fact that the Poland BIT, unlike other BITs,
protects commercial activity as well as investment.
A second important change appears in the protocol. Specifically,
the protocol permits Poland to delay the transfer of "profits derived
from an investment" in accordance with Polish law in effect at the time
the BIT was signed, subject to certain limitations. 28 4  The referenced
Polish exchange law provides that an investor may transfer profits in
any calendar year only up to the amount of the surplus of its exports in
that year over its expenditures on imports.28 5 In addition, the investor is
permitted to obtain foreign currency for fifteen percent of its profits in
excess of the export surplus.2 6 The protocol essentially imposes on
Poland the obligation to increase yearly the percentage of profits over
and above the export surplus which it will permit the investor to trans-
fer. Thus, as of January 1, 1992, Poland is required to permit an
investor to transfer twenty percent of all profits gained in 1990 or later
and not previously transferred. This figure rises to thirty-five percent on
January 1, 1993; fifty percent on January 1, 1994; eighty percent on
January 1, 1995; and 100 percent on January 1, 1996. In effect, Poland
promises full convertibility as of January 1, 1996. If full convertibility
280. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. 11(7). For a summary of the judicial access
provision, see supra text accompanying note 137.
281. See supra text accompanying note 266.
282. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. X(2)-(5). The denial would not be reviewable
under the investor-to-State disputes provision because denials of investment authorization
were excluded from the coverage of that provision. See infra text accompanying note 322.
283. Id. art. V(1).
284. Id Protocol, para, 4.
285. Id. Letter of Submittal.
286. Id.
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is achieved prior to that date, then the protocol requires Poland to permit
transfers of profits to be made without limitation from the date full
convertibility is achieved.287
The protocol also provides that, during the period in which profits
are not freely transferable, Poland shall guarantee to the investor an
opportunity to reinvest any profits which Poland has not permitted to be
transferred.288 In particular, Poland must ensure that the investor has the
opportunity to invest such profits in a bank account that yields a "posi-
tive real rate of interest., 28
9
The Poland BIT's exception to free transferability differs from that
found in most other BITs in that it applies only to profits from an
investment and only for a limited time until free transferability of Polish
currency is achieved. Most other BITs, by contrast, permit an exception
to free transferability only for sale or liquidation proceeds and only in
exceptional circumstances.
290
5. Investor-to-State Dispute Provision
The Poland BIT modified the investor-to-State dispute provision in
a number of ways that reflect the fact that Poland was not a member of
ICSID at the time the Poland BIT was signed. First, the Poland BIT
provides that Poland consents to arbitration before the Additional
Facility or by an ad hoc tribunal established under the UNCITRAL
rules, as modified by mutual agreement. 29' One modification to the
UNCITRAL Rules specified by the Poland BIT is that the appointing
authority shall be the Secretary General of ICSID,292 language which
also appears in the Bulgaria BIT.293  The Poland BIT also constitutes
Poland's consent to conciliation or arbitration before ICSID, provided
that Poland becomes a party to the ICSID Convention.294
287. id. Protocol, para. 4.
288. Id. Protocol, para. 5.
289. Id.
290. See e.g., Egypt BIT, supra note 42, Protocol, para. 10; Zaire BIT, supra note 45,
Protocol, para. l(b); Bangladesh BIT, supra note 47, Protocol, para. 4; Turkey BIT, supra
note 50, Protocol, para. 2(b), Tunisia BIT, supra note 73, Protocol, para. 3; Sri Lanka BIT,
supra note 72, Protocol, para. 6.
The Zaire BIT, however, differs from the other BITs above. It not only has an escape
clause permitting delay of sale or liquidation proceeds, but also permits Zaire to delay full
implementation of the transfers article for a period of three years, beginning with the date on
which the Zaire BIT entered into force. See Zaire BIT, supra note 45, Protocol, para. l(a).
291. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. IX(3)(b)(ii).
292. Id.
293. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VI(3)(b)(ii).
294. Id.
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The Poland BIT provides that the investor may consent to ad hoc
arbitration under any rules upon which the investor and host State
mutually agree.295 This language adds relatively little to the treaty
because it does not include Poland's consent to such arbitration. This
provision thus only makes explicit that which was implicit in the BIT:
the investor and the host State by mutual agreement may choose a
dispute resolution mechanism other than those specified by the BIT.
The choice of arbitration before ICSID, through the Additional Facility,
under the UNCITRAL Rules, or under any other set of rules mutually
agreed upon was incorporated into the 1992 draft296 and the BITs based
on that draft. Prior to that draft, it had appeared in BITs with Russia,297
the Czech and Slovak Republics,298 Argentina,2 99 and Bulgaria.3
A second change attributable to the fact that Poland had not become
a party to the ICSID Convention was a requirement that the place of
any arbitration conducted pursuant to the investor-to-State dispute article
be in a State that is a party to the New York Convention to ensure
enforceability of the award. 30' A similar provision appears in the BITs
based on the 1992 draft3°2 and, prior to that draft, in BITs with Haiti,
30 3
the Czech and Slovak Republics, 3° 4 Russia,30 5 Argentina, 3° and Bulgar-
ia. 307
A third such change is an undertaking by each party to comply with
any award resulting from an arbitration pursuant to the investor-to-State
dispute article.308 This language merely reflects an overabundance of
caution by BIT negotiators, since the obligation to comply with an
award is implicit in a party's consent to binding arbitration. Similar
language appears in the BITs based on the 1992 draft3° and, prior to
295. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. IX(3)(a).
296. 1992 draft, supra note 40, art. VI(3)(a).
297. Russia BIT, supra note 71, art. VI(3)(a).
298. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. VI(3)(a).
299. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. VII(3)(a).
300. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VI(3)(a).
301. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. IX(3)(d). For further discussion, see supra text
accompanying notes 226-34.
302. 1992 draft, supra note 40, art. VII(5).
303. Haiti BIT, supra note 49, art. VII(3)(d).
304. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. VI(3)(d).
305. Russia BIT, supra note 71, art. VI(3)(d).
306. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. VII(5).
307. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VI(3)(d).
308. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. IX(3)(e).
309. 1992 draft, supra note 40, art. VI(6).
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that draft, in BITs with Russia,31° Argentina,3 ' Bulgaria,312 and the
Czech and Slovak Republics. 3
A final such change is a requirement that each party provide for the
enforcement in its territory of arbitral awards issued pursuant to the
investor-to-State dispute provision. 4 Comparable language appears in
the BITs based on the 1992 draft315 as well as in BITs with Panama,31 6
Haiti, 317 the Czech and Slovak Republics,31 Russia, 31 9 Argentina, 3 ° and
Bulgaria.32'
The Poland BIT also modified the investor-to-State dispute provi-
sion in a way that reflects the Poland BIT's relative tolerance of invest-
ment screening. Specifically, the investor-to-State dispute provision
excludes from its coverage disputes involving denials of investment
authorizations.322 A similar provision appears in the Bulgaria BIT.3z
The Poland BIT also excludes such disputes from the coverage of the
judicial access provision.
Finally, the Poland BIT contains one other change that is unique to
that treaty. It provides that, in the event that a third party succeeds to
the claims of the investor against the host State by virtue of subrogation
or assignment, the investor shall not continue to pursue its claim against
the host State except on behalf of that third party.325 Thus, for example,
where an expropriated U.S. investor received compensation under an
insurance agreement with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC) and OPIC thereby became subrogated to the investor's claim for
compensation against Poland, the U.S. investor no longer could pursue
its claim against Poland except on behalf of OPIC.326 By contrast, under
310. Russia BIT, supra note 71, art. VI(3)(e).
311. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. VII(6).
312. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VI(3)(e).
313. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. VI(3)(e).
314. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. IX(3)(e).
315. 1992 draft, supra note 40, art. VI(6).
316. Panama BIT, supra note 43, art. VII(3)(d).
317. Haiti BIT, supra note 49, art. VII(3)(d).
318. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. VI(3)(e).
319. Russia BIT, supra note 71, art. VI(3)(e).
320. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. VII(6).
321. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VI(3)(e).
322. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. IX(l).
323. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VI(1)(c); see also infra text accompanying note
616.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 280-82.
325. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. IX(4).
326. It is unclear that the treaty provision actually would preclude the investor from
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the model negotiating texts, an investor who had been compensated by
some third party for an injury to investment caused by the host State
was permitted to continue to pursue any claims against the host State,
notwithstanding the receipt of such compensation or the fact that the
third party had become subrogated to the claim.
6. Special Investment Treatment Provisions
The Poland BIT contains a provision intended to address specific
problems that investors have encountered in Eastern Europe in the
past.327 This provision, in slightly varying forms, appears in the BITs
with Russia,328 the Czech and Slovak Republics,32 9 Romania,33 Kazakh-
stan, T3 Armenia,32 Bulgaria,333 and Kyrgyzstan334 as well.
The provision requires each party to offer nationals and companies
of the other party MFN and national treatment status with respect to
eleven matters. These matters include: (1) the granting of franchises or
rights under license; (2) the issuance of approvals necessary for the
conduct of commercial activity; (3) access to financial institutions and
credit markets; (4) access to the investors' funds held in financial
institutions; (5) the importation of equipment necessary for conducting
business; (6) the dissemination of commercial information; (7) the
conduct of market studies; (8) the appointment of commercial represen-
tatives and their participation in trade fairs or other promotional events;
(9) the marketing of goods and services; (10) access to public utilities,
public services, and commercial rental space at nondiscriminatory prices,
if prices are controlled by the government; and (11) access to raw
materials, inputs, and services at nondiscriminatory prices, if prices are
controlled by the government.
Two other special investment provisions in the Poland BIT are
noteworthy. One requires each party to provide nationals and compa-
nies of the other party with national and MFN treatment with respect to
the sale and acquisition of equity shares and other securities. 3" This
pursuing the claim as a matter of law because the investor is not a party to the BIT.
327. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. 11(8).
328. Russia BIT, supra note 71, art. I(1)(e).
329. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. 11 (1), (10).
330. Romania BIT, supra note 70, arts. l(1)(e), 11(1).
331. Kazakhstan BIT, supra note 68, art. 11(10).
332. Armenia BIT, supra note 64, art. II(10).
333. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. 11(10).
334. Kyrgyzstan BIT, supra note 69, art. 11(10).
335. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. 11(9).
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provision is subject to each party's right to make exceptions falling
within one of the matters or sectors listed in the annex. The other
provision requires 'Poland to provide MFN treatment to U.S. nationals
and companies with respect to the acquisition of interests in any govern-
mentally owned enterprise in the process of privatization.336
7. Customs Unions and the GATT
The Poland BIT contains language under which the MFN and
national treatment provisions shall not apply to advantages accorded
pursuant to a party's binding obligations under any multilateral agree-
ment within the framework of the GATT.337 This provision was attrib-
utable to the fact that the Poland BIT, unlike other BITs, addressed
commercial activity as well as investment.338 Although novel when
incorporated into the Poland BIT, this language has become standard in
the 1991 and 1992 drafts.339
The Poland BIT also has a standard provision exempting from its
general MFN and national treatment provisions any advantage accorded
by virtue of a party's membership in a customs union or free trade
area. 31 Similar language had initially appeared in the Egypt,341 Moroc-
co,3 2 Bangladesh, 343 and Haiti344 BITs and was added to the model
negotiating text beginning with the 1987 draft.345
8. Intellectual Property
The Poland BIT has very extensive and detailed provisions on
intellectual property protection. As an initial matter, several types of
intellectual property are explicitly included within the definition of
investment,346 while the acquisition and protection of intellectual proper-
ty are included as an "associated activity," as that term is used in the
BIT.347 These provisions make clear that intellectual property receives
336. Id.
337. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. XII(2)(b).
338. See supra text accompanying notes 256-65.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 191-97.
340. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. XII(2)(a).
341. Egypt BIT, supra note 42, Protocol, para. 4.
342. Morocco BIT, supra note 44, Protocol, para. 2(a).
343. Bangladesh BIT, supra note 47, Protocol, para. 2.
344. Haiti BIT, supra note 49, art. 11(12).
345. See supra text accompanying notes 148-54.
346. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. l(1)(b)(iv).
347. Id art. I(1)(e).
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the same protection as investment generally. 348
A separate provision, however, requires the parties to provide
"adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights" and includes a nonexhaustive list of measures entailed
by that requirement, such as extending copyright protection to computer
programs; providing product as well as process patent protection for
pharmaceuticals and chemicals; and providing adequate and effective
protection for integrated circuit layout designs and against unfair compe-
tition generally.349
Finally, an exchange of letters between Poland and the United States
imposes still additional obligations on Poland. In particular, Poland
agreed to adhere to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works 350 and to enact legislation to protect intellectual
property by certain prescribed dates.351  A series of annexes to the
exchange of letters describes the details of the legislation.352
9. Agency for Foreign Investments
In an exchange of letters, Poland agreed to designate a Deputy
President of its Agency for Foreign Investment to assist U.S. investors
in obtaining the full benefits of the agreement. The Deputy President's
responsibility is to function as a "government coordinator and problem
solver" for U.S. investors.353 The Deputy President in particular will
provide information on business and investment laws, potential invest-
ment projects and sources of finance and will also assist investors
having difficulty repatriating profits or obtaining foreign exchange.354
The BITs with the Czech and Slovak Republics, 355 Romania,356 and Bul-
garia 35 provide for the designation of a similar official.
348. The explicit inclusion of intellectual property in the general definition of investment
was later incorporated in the 1991 draft. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. The
inclusion of intellectual property as an "associated activity" tracks language that had been
standard in the 1984 and 1987 drafts. See 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. I(1)(e); 1987 draft,
supra note 38, art. I(1)(e).
349. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. IV.
350. Completed at Paris May 4, 1896, S. TREATY Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986), 331 U.N.T.S. 217.
351. Poland BIT, supra note 62, Exchange of Letters (Mar. 21, 1990),
352. Id., Exchange of Letters, Annexes 1-3.
353. Id., Exchange of Letters.
354. Id.
355. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, Exchange of Letters (Oct. 22, 1991).
356. Romania BIT, supra note 70, Exchange of Letters (May 28, 1992).
357. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, Exchange of Letters (Sept. 23, 1992).
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10. Information Exchange and Transparency
The Poland BIT also has more extensive provisions on information
exchange than other BITs. In addition to the standard provision con-
tained in other BITs, stating that each party will publish all relevant
laws,358 the Poland BIT contains a requirement that each party make
publicly available all nonconfidential, nonproprietary information which
may be useful for investment and commercial activities. 359 Each party
also is required to disseminate to its own business community informa-
tion made available by the other party, where the information will assist
investors in settling disputes that may arise under the treaty.3"
C. Tunisia
The Tunisia BIT is based on the 1987 draft with a number of minor
changes, generally made for purposes of clarification. A few changes
are noteworthy and are described below.
1. Expropriation Compensation
The provision that requires prompt, adequate, and effective compen-
sation for expropriation omits the language explicitly requiring the
payment of interest from the date of expropriation until the date of
payment, at the market rate of exchange on the date of expropriation.
36
'
The protocol, however, does guarantee to an expropriated investor
payment of "an amount to compensate for any delay in payment that
may occur.,
362
This language is intended to impose the substantive equivalent of a
requirement of interest. A similar approach has been used in other BITs
with Muslim countries - including Egypt, 63 Morocco, 36' and Turkey
365
- because of religious sensitivities about explicit references to interest.
The protocol language in the Tunisia BIT also requires the use of a
commercial exchange rate on the date of expropriation,3  language
358. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. VIII(2). See supra text accompanying note 138.
359. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. VIIl(2).
360. i art. VIII(3).
361. Tunisia BIT, supra note 73, art. 111(1).
362. L Protocol, para. 2.
363. Egypt BIT, supra note 42, art. III(1).
364. Morocco BIT, supra note 44, Protocol, para. 4.
365. Turkey BIT, supra note 50, art. 111(2).
366. Tunisia BIT, supra note 73, Protocol, para. 2.
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similar to that used in the Morocco BIT.367
The expropriation compensation provision of the Tunisia BIT further
differs froni the model texts in that it specifies that compensation must
equal the "full value" rather than the "fair market value" of the expro-
priated investment.3 68 Tunisia requested this change because it does not
have a fully developed market economy.369 The use of the term full
value does not alter the substance of the provision .3 ' The same term is
used in the Panama37' and Morocco 372 BITs.
2. Currency Exchange
As an initial matter, the currency exchange provision of the Tunisia
BIT has been slightly narrowed in scope because the right of free
exchange applies only to certain enumerated payments, rather than to all
payments related to an investment, as is the case in the model negotiat-
ing texts.373 The list of enumerated payments is that which appears in
the 1987 draft.374 In the model negotiating text, however, the list was
merely illustrative, while in the Tunisia BIT it is exhaustive. In any
event, the list is broad enough that the provision guarantees substantial
protection for U.S. investors.
The Tunisia BIT also modifies the language of the transfers article
in several minor respects. It provides that transfers shall be made in a
"freely convertible currency" rather than a "freely usable currency."
375
The former term was employed in the 1984 draft of the model negotiat-
ing text 376 and thus does not represent a departure from U.S. practice.
Additionally, the phrase "prevailing rate of exchange for commercial
transactions" replaces "prevailing market rate of exchange" and the
requirement that the exchange rate be calculated "with respect to spot
transactions in the currency to be transferred" is omitted.377 These
changes bring the language of the Tunisia BIT in close conformity with
367. Morocco BIT, supra note 44, Protocol, para. 4.
368. Tunisia BIT, supra note 73, art. III (1).
369. d Letter of Submittal (from Deputy Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger to President
George Bush, Apr. 24, 1991).
370. VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 128. The term "full value" was the formulation
used in the modern FCN treaty series and is synonymous with "fair market value."
371. Panama BIT, supra note 43, art. IV(I).
372. Morocco BIT, supra note 44, art. 111(3).
373. Tunisia BIT, supra note 73, art. IV(I).
374. 1987 draft, supra note 38, art. IV(I).
375. Tunisia BIT, supra note 73, art. IV(2).
376. 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. IV(2).
377. Tunisia BIT, supra note 73, art. IV(2).
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that of the Morocco BIT.378 The changes were made to "reflect actual
conditions with respect to Tunisian currency" and are not believed by
the U.S. government to change the provision materially.37 9 A similar
rationale lay behind the Morocco BIT changes. 310
The substantially more significant change to the currency exchange
provision is the inclusion of an escape clause in the protocol.38' That
clause permits Tunisia to delay temporarily the transfer of sale or
liquidation proceeds "in exceptional financial or economic circumstances
relating to foreign exchange. 38 2  The delay, however, is subject to
certain conditions. Specifically, it must be on a national and MFN
treatment basis and may not exceed three years, during which the
investor must have an opportunity to invest the proceeds in a way that
will preserve their value until transfer occurs.
The Tunisia BIT escape clause is very similar to that in the Turkey
BIT.383 Comparable clauses also appear in the Egypt,38 4 Bangladesh,385
Zaire,386 and Sri Lanka38 7 BITs. In each case, the escape clause has
been a response to a concern by a BIT partner that its limited foreign
exchange may preclude it at times from permitting transfer of the
potentially large sums involved in the sale or liquidation of an invest-
ment.
3. MFN and National Treatment
The Tunisia BIT modifies the approach generally used in the BITs
to specify exceptions to the obligation of national or MFN treatment.
Rather than specifying certain sectors of the economy in which either
party may deny national or MFN treatment to covered investment, the
Tunisia BIT states that the parties' existing laws and regulations are
excepted from the national treatment requirement with respect to the
right to establish investment.388 In the case of Tunisia, these existing
laws include: (1) an Agriculture and Fishing Code which limits foreign
378. Morocco BIT, supra note 44, art. IV(2) (providing that transfers "shall be made at
the prevailing rate of exchange used for commercial purposes..
379. Tunisia BIT, supra note 73, Letter of Submittal.
380. VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 148.
381. Tunisia BIT, supra note 73, Protocol, para. 3.
382. Id.
383. Turkey BIT, supra note 50, Protocol, para. 2(b).
384. Egypt BIT, supra note 42, Protocol, para. 10.
385. Bangladesh BIT, supra note 47, Protocol, para. 4.
386. Zaire BIT, supra note 45, Protocol, para. 1(b).
387. Sri Lanka BIT, supra note 72, Protocol, para. 6.
388. Tunisia BIT, supra note 73, art. 11(1).
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participation in agricultural investment to fifty percent, requires authori-
zation from the Ministry of Agriculture for all foreign investment in
agriculture, and restricts foreign ownership of land in Tunisia; and (2) a
Service Industry Code which permits service industry firms to be
majority owned by foreign investors only if the firm serves the export
market exclusively. 3
89
The Tunisia BIT language would appear to be more restrictive than
the model negotiating text because it makes no provision for future
exceptions. A right to make future exceptions, however, is reserved for
the United States in certain sectors specified in the protocol.39 Special
provisions permitting some form of investment screening also appear in
BITS with Panama, 391 Morocco, 392 Turkey,393 Poland,394 the Czech and
Slovak Republics, 395 and Russia.
396
The Tunisia BIT was transmitted to the Senate accompanied by a
letter from Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger explaining
certain provisions of the treaty. Deputy Secretary Eagleburger's letter,
however, appears open to misinterpretation with respect to this provision
of the Tunisia BIT. Specifically, the letter refers to article X(2) of the
Tunisia BIT, which provides that the treaty "shall not preclude either
Party from requiring that investments and associated activities be estab-
lished in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in its
legislation provided that such terms and conditions do not impair any
right set forth in this Treaty. 397 The letter concludes that, as a result of
article X(2), Tunisia "is permitted to favor its own nationals with respect
to the establishment of investment., 391 In fact, however, article II(1)
guarantees national treatment with respect to establishment of invest-
ment, except to the extent of each Party's existing laws and regulations.
Because article X(2) expressly does not authorize impairment of any
treaty right, it is subordinate to article II(1). In short, the Tunisia BIT
permits Tunisia to favor its own nationals with respect to the
389. Treaty with Tunisia Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, supra note 77, at 5-6.
390. Tunisia BIT, supra note 73, Protocol, para. 1.
391. Panama BIT, supra note 43, art. 11(1).
392. Morocco BIT, supra note 44, art. 11(1).
393. Turkey BIT, supra note 50, art. 11(1).
394. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. II(1).
395. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, Exchange of Letters (Oct. 22, 1991).
396. Russia BIT, supra note 71, Protocol, para. 4.
397. Tunisia BIT, supra note 73, Letter of Submittal.
398. d.
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establishment of investment only to the extent of Tunisia's existing laws
and not under any future law.
4. Performance Requirements
The prohibition on performance requirements that appeared in all of
the model negotiating texts was weakened in the Tunisia BIT such that
the parties are required only to "endeavor not to impose" them.399 At
the time the Tunisia BIT was submitted to the Senate, the U.S. govern-
ment believed Tunisia was no longer applying performance require-
ments, except for a provision of the Tunisian Service Industry Code
under which service industry firms may be 100 percent foreign owned
only if they serve the export market exclusively, while those which
serve the domestic market must be majority owned by Tunisians. '
The prohibition on performance requirements generally has been one
of the most difficult BIT provisions on which to reach agreement. In
fact, six other BITs - those with Egypt,4° 1 Morocco,4 Zaire,403 Bangla-
desh,4' Haiti,405 and Turkey4 - modified their performance require-
ments in a manner similar to the Tunisia BIT. The Sri Lanka BIT also
modified the performance requirements provision, although in a some-
what different fashion,' and the Argentina BIT contains a limited
exception to the performance requirements provision."
The difficulty in negotiating the performance requirements provi-
sions has been a matter-of-some concern to the Senate. In reporting the
first eight BITs favorably to the Senate in 1988, the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations noted that it would have preferred that the perfor-
mance requirements provisions had not been modified during negotia-
tions.4 U.S. negotiators in fact have been far more successful in
preserving the performance requirements provision intact in the second
wave of BITs than they were in the first, and the Senate has not pursued
the matter further.
399. Id. art. 11(6).
400. See Treaty with Tunisia Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection
of Investment, supra note 77.
401. Egypt BIT, supra note 42, art. 11(6).
402. Morocco BIT, supra note 44, art. 11(5).
403. Zaire BIT, supra note 45, art. 11(7).
404. Bangladesh BIT, supra note 47, art. 11(6).
405. Haiti BIT, supra note 49, art. 11(7).
406. Turkey BIT, supra note 50, art. 11(7).
407. See infra text accompanying notes 423-27.
408. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, Protocol, para. 9.
409. Bilateral Investment Treaties with Panama, Senegal, Zaire, Morocco, Turkey,
Cameroon, Bangladesh, Egypt and Grenada, supra note 54, at 3.
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5. Employment Rights
The 1987 draft contained an employment provision that guaranteed
to investors the right to employ the top managerial personnel of their
choice "regardless of nationality."41 The basic purpose of this provision
was to protect investors against host State laws requiring that nationals
of such States be given preference in employment.
The Tunisia BIT modified that provision so that it is subject to the
right of each party to prescribe "fair procedures" in connection with the
employment of such personnel.4 ' This change appears to subordinate
the right to choose top managerial personnel to local law, provided that
local law meets a rather amorphous standard of "fairness."
6. Application to Existing Investment
Like the model negotiating texts, the Tunisia BIT applies to "invest-
ments made or acquired after the time of entry into force as well as to
investments existing at the time of entry into force."4 2 That provision,
however, is followed by an additional sentence stating that "[i]f any
issue arises with respect to any pre-1956 U.S. investment, the two sides
agree to consult as necessary on such issues to reach a satisfactory
solution.,
413
The policy of the United States was to refuse proposals by potential
BIT partners to treat pre-treaty investment differently than post-treaty
investment.4 4 The Tunisia BIT appears to be consistent with this policy
since the additional sentence does little more than add an obligation to
consult and does not derogate from the general dispute resolution
mechanisms of the BIT. The sentence was included because of Tuni-
sia's concern about pre-independence investments. 4 '5 Ultimately, the
sentence may be irrelevant because there may not be any pre-1956 U.S.
investment in Tunisia.416
410. 1987 draft, supra note 38, art. 1(4).
411. Tunisia BIT, supra note 73, art. 11(5).
412. Id. art. XIII(I).
413. Il
414. VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 32-33. For a discussion of the minor departures
from this practice that have occurred, see id. at 64-65.
415. Tunisia BIT, supra note 73, Letter of Submittal.
416. Id.
Summer 1993]
Michigan Journal of International Law
D. Sri Lanka
The text of the Sri Lanka BIT follows very closely that of the 1991
draft, although a protocol to the treaty contains numerous paragraphs
clarifying certain provisions of the main text. In a couple of instances,
the protocol effects substantive changes.
1. Currency Exchange
The protocol contains an escape clause permitting either party to
delay the transfer of sale or liquidation proceeds "in the event of excep-
tional balance of payments difficulties."4 7 The delay is subject to the
condition that it cannot exceed three years. Additionally, during each
year of delay, the investor must be permitted to transfer a third of the
proceeds, and the investor must have the opportunity to invest the
delayed proceeds in a manner that will preserve their value, free of
exchange risk. Similar clauses have been included in the Egypt, 1 8
Zaire,419 Bangladesh, 420 Turkey,42' and Tunisia 422 BITs.
2. Performance Requirements
The protocol notes that Sri Lanka has laws that provide incentives
for meeting performance requirements relating to exports or the contri-
bution of new technology. 423 The United States was concerned that this
incentive program might pose a barrier to U.S. investment. 424 Thus, the
protocol states that the parties agree to consult at the request of either,
should "adverse effects" arise from such laws, with a view to eliminat-
ing the adverse effects. 42
Sri Lanka presumably did not consider its incentive program to
violate the general prohibition on performance requirements because it
involved incentives for engaging in particular conduct rather than
penalties. The Panama BIT is similar in noting that Panama provides
certain incentives to businesses without including any obligation to
417. Sri Lanka BIT, supra note 72, Protocol, para. 6.
418. Egypt BIT, supra note 42, Protocol, para. 10.
419. Zaire BIT, supra note 45, Protocol, para. l(b).
420. Bangladesh BIT, supra note 47, Protocol, para. 4.
421. Turkey BIT, supra note 50, Protocol, para. 2(b).
422. Tunisia BIT, supra note 73, Protocol, para. 3.
423. Sri Lanka BIT, supra note 72, Protocol, para. 4.
424. Treaty with Sri Lanka Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, supra note 77, at 2.
425. Sri Lanka BIT, supra note 72, Protocol, para. 4.
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terminate the incentive program.426 As discussed above, the elimination
of performance requirements has been a particularly difficult goal to
achieve.427
E. Czech and Slovak Republics
The Czech Republic BIT and the Slovak Republic BIT actually were
negotiated as a single treaty with the Czech and Slovak Federal Repub-
lic. The treaty was signed on October 22, 1991, amid predictions of the
ultimate break up of the Federal Republic. Ratification of the treaty was
carried out on an expedited basis by both parties428 and the treaty
entered into force on December 19, 1992.
On January 1, 1993, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic separat-
ed into two new States: the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.
Each new State accepted the treaty obligations of the former Federal
Republic. Thus, the single Czech and Slovak Federal Republic BIT
entered into force for the two new republics on January 1, 1993.
Because they are successors to a single treaty, the Czech Republic
BIT and the Slovak Republic BIT are identical, at least in the English
text. Both refer to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic rather than
to the two successor republics.
The Czech and Slovak BITs are based on the 1991 draft, with a
number of modifications of no real significance. Indeed, the Czech and
Slovak BITs contain fewer differences from the model negotiating text
than did the Poland BIT, the first Eastern European BIT to receive
Senate approval.
1. MFN and National Treatment
The most significant changes in the Czech and Slovak BIT from the
model negotiating text involve the right to national and MFN treatment
guaranteed by article II and reflect the Czech and Slovak Republics'
transformation from communism to a market economy. An exchange of
letters dated October 22, 1991, which accompanied signature of the
treaty, permits the Czech and Slovak Republics to require U.S. investors
seeking to acquire or establish investment in the Czech or Slovak
Republics to obtain government approval in either of two 'situations.
The first situation occurs where the U.S. investor seeks to invest in or
426. Panama BIT, supra note 43, Agreed Minutes, no. 2.
427. See supra text accompanying notes 400-09.
428. See Treaty with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, supra note 77, at 6-8.
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with a company that is majority-owned by the State.4 29 Secretary of
State James Baker's letter submitting the treaty to the President de-
scribes the situation as one in which "U.S. nationals or companies
acquire majority ownership of State companies."43 Contrary to Secre-
tary Baker's letter, however, the letters do not seem to limit this first
situation to acquisition of majority ownership. Rather, they define it
more broadly to include any investment in a State company.4"' The
second situation occurs where the U.S. investor seeks to acquire the
equity interest of the government of the Czech or Slovak Republic in a
company.
The exchange of letters, however, places certain conditions on the
right of the Czech and Slovak Republics to screen out U.S. investors in
these situations. One condition requires that the request for approval not
be denied for the purpose of limiting competition or discouraging
investment by U.S. nationals and companies, except in those sectors
listed in the annex.432 Another condition holds that the granting of such
approvals shall be on an MFN basis.433 The parties also agree to consult
in two years with a view toward narrowing and ultimately phasing out
the approvals authorized by the exchange of notes. The substance of
this exchange of letters is similar in many ways to provisions in the
Poland434 and Russia435 BITs.
Finally, the exchange of letters also recites the parties' understand-
ing that the governments of the Czech and Slovak Republics are to
approve new commercial codes liberalizing the procedures for govern-
ment approval of foreign investment in a manner consistent with the
treaties. The new codes were enacted and became effective on January
1, 1992.436
429. The letters describe this category of investments as "investments of nationals or
companies of the United States in or with companies the majority of the assets or ownership
of which are owned by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic." Czech and Slovak BITs,
supra note 67, Exchange of Letters (Oct. 22, 1991).
430. Id. Letter of Submittal (from Secretary of State James A. Baker III to President
George Bush, May 12, 1992). The Secretary's understanding was repeated in the Report of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. See Treaty with the Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, supra note
77, at 5.
431. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, Exchange of Letters.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Poland BIT, supra note 62, Exchange of Letters (Mar. 21, 1990).
435. Russia BIT, supra note 71, Protocol, para. 4.
436. Treaty with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, supra note 77, at 5.
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2. Special Treatment Provisions
Another change to article II reflecting the transformation of the
economy of the Czech and Slovak Republics is the inclusion of a list of
additional activities which are to be considered "associated activities"
within the meaning of the BIT.437 The significance of so designating
these activities is that each party must afford national and MFN treat-
ment to investors of the other party with respect to such activities.
The list follows very closely a similar list that appeared in the
Poland BIT 3' and which has been repeated with variations in the BITs
with Russia,439 ' Kazakhstan,"6 Armenia,"' Romania, 442 Bulgaria," 3 and
Kyrgyzstan.' It includes activities such as the granting of franchises
and licenses; access to financial institutions and credit markets; the
importation of equipment; the marketing of goods and services; and
access to public utilities, public services, commercial rental space, raw
materials, and inputs at nondiscriminatory prices, if prices are set or
controlled by the government. Essentially, the list covers activities
which traditionally have posed problems for foreign investors in Eastern
European countries.
3. Customs Union
The Czech and Slovak BITs contain the standard customs union
exception as it appeared in the 1991 draft.44 Additional language in the
protocol acknowledges that the terms of the customs union exception are
satisfied if an economic relationship between a BIT party and a third
country includes a free trade area or customs union." This language
ensures that, in the event that the Czech or Slovak Republic becomes
part of a supranational entity involving economic and even political
integration beyond that normally associated with a customs union or free
trade area, whether the European Community or some association of
East European states, such membership would fall within the customs
437. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. 11(10).
438. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. 11(8).
439. Russia BIT, supra note 71, art. I(1)(e).
440. Kazakhstan BIT, supra note 68, art. 11(10)
441. Armenia BIT, supra note 64, art. 11(10).
442. Romania BIT, supra note 70, art. I(1)(e).
443. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. 11(10).
444. Kyrgyzstan BIT, supra note 69, art. 11(10).
445. Czech and Slovak BIT, supra note 67, art. II(9)(a).
446. I. Protocol, para. 3.
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union exception. As such, the language merely clarifies what in all
likelihood would have been the U.S. understanding in any event.
Similar language appears in the Romania BIT. 47
4. Investor-to-State Dispute Provision
The investor-to-State dispute provision includes a number of chang-
es attributable to the fact that the Czech and Slovak Republics were not
parties to the ICSID Convention at the time the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic BIT was signed. First it provides for binding third-
party arbitration: (1) under ICSID where the relevant party has adhered
to the ICSID Convention; (2) before the Additional Facility where such
adherence has not occurred; (3) under the UNCITRAL Rules; or
(4) under any other set of rules to which the parties mutually agree.'
The same alternatives are provided for in BITs based on the 1992 draft
and in earlier BITs with Poland, 449 Russia,45  Argentina,451 and Bulgar-
ia.452  The Czech and Slovak BITs also require that arbitration take
place in a State that is a party to the New York Convention to ensure
that the arbitral award will be enforceable in domestic courts under that
Convention,453 and require each party to provide for enforcement of
arbitral awards in its territory.454 Similar provisions have been included
in BITs based on the 1992 draft455 and, prior to that draft, in BITs with
Panama,4 56 Haiti,457 Poland,458 Argentina,459 Russia,' 6 and Bulgaria."
447. Romania BIT, supra note 70, Protocol, para. 2.
448. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. VI(3)(a).
449. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. IX(3)(a).
450. Russia BIT, supra note 71, art. V1(3)(a).
451. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. VII(3)(a).
452. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VI(3)(a).
453. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. VI(3)(d). See also supra text accompa-
nying notes 220-25.
454. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. VI(3)(e).
455. 1992 draft, supra note 40, art. VI(6).
456. Panama BIT, supra note 43, art. VII (3)(d). The Panama BIT omits the provision
with respect to the New York Convention.
457. Haiti BIT, supra note 49, art. VII (3)(d).
458. Poland BIT, supra note 62, arts. IX(3)(d) and (e).
459. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. VII(5) and VII(6).
460. Russia BIT, supra note 71, art VI(3)(d) and (e).
461. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VI(3)(d) and (e).
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5. Investment Facilitation
An exchange of letters dated October 22, 1991, memorializes the
intent of the Czech and Slovak Republics to designate an entity to
ensure that U.S. investors receive the full benefits of the treaty.462 The
function of this entity will include providing information regarding
business laws and regulations, proposed changes in laws and regulations
affecting investors, and investment projects and sources of financing.
The entity also will coordinate with national, regional, and local govern-
ments to facilitate investment and assist investors who experience
difficulties with the establishment and operation of investments. The
Poland,43 Romania,464 and Bulgaria 65 BITS have similar provisions.
F. Russia
The main text of the Russia BIT is based on the 1991 draft, al-
though it contains a variety of minor changes generally intended either
to clarify the model language or to improve the style of the agreement.
The protocol does contain a few changes that are of some significance
and that generally are attributable either to Russia's conversion from a
command to a market economy or to the disintegration of the Soviet
Union. One provision of the protocol, relating to the security interests
exception, is not attributable to either of these events, however, and
raises some questions about the strength of the protection afforded by
the Russia BIT.466
1. Definition of Control
The BITs generally protect only investment in the territory of one
party "owned or controlled" by nationals or companies of the other
party. The terms "own" and "control" were not defined in the model
negotiating texts and the United States generally resists attempts to
define the terms, although it had agreed to define the term "control" in
two prior BITs. Specifically, the Egypt BIT defines control as having
"a substantial share of ownership rights and the ability to exercise
decisive influence." 467 The Poland BIT defines the term to mean "hav-
462. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, Exchange of Letters.
463. Poland BIT, supra note 62, Exchange of Letters (March 21, 1990).
464. Romania BIT, supra note 70, Exchange of Letters (May 28, 1992).
465. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, Exchange. of Letters (Sept. 23, 1992).
466. See infra text accompanying notes 509-16.
467. Egypt BIT, supra note 42, Protocol, para. 2.
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ing a substantial interest in or the ability to exercise substantial influ-
ence over the management and operation of an investment .... 468
The Russia BIT does not define the term, but lists three factors to
be considered, among others, in determining control. These are a
substantial interest in the investment, the ability to exercise substantial
influence over the management and operation of the investment, and the
ability to exercise substantial influence over the composition of the
managing body.69 The same provision notes that "the question of
control will depend on the factual circumstances of the particular
case."
470
2. Right to Establish Investment
The protocol of the Russia BIT reserves for Russia the right to
require prior permission for "large scale" investments as defined in the
Russian Federation Law on Foreign Investments of July 4, 1991. 47 , This
right, however, is subject to a five year time limit. The term large scale
investments as currently defined refers to investments of $800,000 or
more.472 Within one year of the treaty's entry into force, the threshold
for screening will be raised to that intended by the law at the time of its
enactment, which would mean that "large scale" investments would be
those of approximately fifty-six million dollars or more.473
During the five year period in which investment screening is al-
lowed, permission to establish investment shall not be denied for the
purpose of limiting competition or discouraging investment by U.S.
nationals or companies in particular sectors of the economy (except for
those listed in the annex). Permission must be granted or denied in
conformity with all other provisions of the treaty, including presumably
the MFN requirements of article II. Similar restrictions on screening
appear in the BITs with Poland474 and the Czech and Slovak Repub-
lics. 475
468. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. I(1)(j).
469. Russia BIT, supra note 71, Protocol, para. 2(b).
470. Id
471. Russia BIT, supra note 71, Protocol, para. 4(a).
472. Id. Letter of Submittal (from Lawrence S. Eagleburger to President George Bush,
July 21, 1991).
473. Id. See also id. Protocol, para. 4(b).
474. Poland BIT, supra note 62, Exchange of Letters (Mar. 21, 1990).
475. Czech and Slovak Republic BITs, supra note 67, Exchange of Letters (Oct. 27,
1991).
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3. Arrangements with Former Soviet Republics
The protocol also contains the parties' acknowledgement that Russia
has certain existing economic arrangements and relationships with the
other States that constituted the former Soviet Union under which
investors of these other States may be guaranteed national treatment
with respect to investment in the sectors specified in the annex.476 The
protocol further acknowledges that the general MFN obligations of the
treaty shall not entitle U.S. investors to the same treatment.477 The MFN
obligations of the treaty, however, will apply to any such future arrange-
ments, unless the arrangement falls within the exception for customs
unions or free trade areas set forth in the Russia BIT.
478
The 1991 draft model negotiating text permits derogations from
MFN treatment attributable to membership in a customs union or free
trade area.479  The Russia BIT goes beyond the model language to
permit some derogations under existing arrangements with certain States,
even in the absence of a formal customs union or free trade area.
The Russia BIT provision, however, is not entirely unprecedented in
BIT practice. The Egypt BIT excludes from the obligation to provide
MFN treatment in the sectors listed in the annex any advantage provided
"by virtue of a special security or regional arrangement, including
regional customs unions or free trade areas., 480 Thus, the Egypt BIT
also permits derogations from MFN treatment attributable to an arrange-
ment that does not meet the formal requirements of a customs union or
free trade area, as long as it is a special security or regional arrange-
ment. The Russia BIT provision arguably is narrower because it applies
only to derogations under existing arrangements with States that were
part of the former Soviet Union.
4. GATT Exception
The Russia BIT moves the GATT exception to the protocol, where
it is reworded.4" In the Russia BIT, the GATT exception applies to
multilateral international agreements under the framework of the GATT
"concluded" after the signature of the BIT. The 1991 draft GATT
476. Russia BIT, supra note 71, Protocol, para. 5(a).
477. Id Protocol, para. 5(b).
478. Id., art. 1(9). The customs union exception is at paragraph 5(c) of the Protocol.
479. 1991 draft, supra note 39, art. II(9)(a).
480. Egypt BIT, supra note 42, Protocol, para. 4.
481. Russia BIT, supra note 71, Protocol, para. 6.
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exception applied to agreements "entered into" subsequent to the BIT412
while the 1992 draft applied to agreements that enter into force subse-
quent to signature of the BIT.483
The Russia BIT contains the parties' agreement to "discuss holding
consultations to determine whether a mutually beneficial basis exists"
for according advantages under GATT related agreements to Russian
investors.484 In short, the United States held out the prospect that it
might, at least in part, decline to invoke the GATT exception with
respect to Russian investors.
5. Associated Activities
The Russia BIT,485 like the BITs with Poland,486 the Czech and
Slovak Republics," 7 Kazakhstan,488 Romania,48 9 Armenia,4 90 Bulgaria,491
and Kyrgyzstan 492 contains a list of additional activities that are consid-
ered "associated activities" within the meaning of the BIT. The lists
vary slightly among the BITs, but generally cover activities that in the
past have presented difficulties for investors in Eastern Europe.
493
6. Investor-to-State Dispute Provision
The Russia BIT modifies in several respects the investor-to-State
dispute provision because Russia had not yet ratified the ICSID Conven-
tion at the time the Russia BIT was signed. The modifications include
provision for arbitration before the ICSID Additional Facility, which
does not require adherence to the ICSID Convention; ad hoc arbitration
using the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) rules;494 or arbitration under any other set of rules to
which the parties mutually agree. This same set of arbitration possibili-
482. 1991 draft, supra note 39, art. II(9)(b).
483. 1992 draft, supra note 40, art. II(9)(b).
484. Russia BIT, supra note 71, Protocol, para. 6.
485. Id. art. I(l)(e) and Protocol, para. 3.
486. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. I(1)(e).
487. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. 11(10).
488. Kazakhstan BIT, supra note 68, art. 11(10).
489. Romania BIT, supra note 70, art. I(1)(e).
490. Armenia BIT, supra note 64, art. 11(10).
491. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. 11(10).
492. Kyrgyzstan BIT, supra note 69, art. 11(10).
493. For illustrative lists, see supra text accompanying notes 327 and 437.
494. Russia BIT, supra note 71, art. VI(3)(a).
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ties also is included in the BITs with Poland,495 the Czech and Slovak
Republics,496 Argentina,497 and Bulgaria 498 and was incorporated into the
1992 draft4 9 and the BITs based thereon. Some of these alternatives
may be illusory in practice because Russia has unconditionally consent-
ed only to arbitration before the Additional Facility and under the
UNCITRAL Rules.5°°
The Russia BIT also includes a requirement that any arbitration
under this provision take place in a State that is a party to the New
York Convention5°' and an obligation to provide for the enforcement of
awards under this provision in the parties' own territories.5" Similar
provisions appear in the BITs based on the 1992 draft as well as in the
BITs with Panama,5°3 Haiti, 5" Poland,0 5 Argentina,5" Bulgaria," and
the Czech and Slovak Republics.5 8
7. Essential Security Interests Exception
One unique provision of the Russia BIT is quite troubling. Specifi-
cally, the protocol confirms the parties' mutual understanding that the
security interests exception5" is "self-judging. 510
The security interests exception exempts from BIT obligations any
measure necessary to further a party's essential security interests. It is
similar to standard language found in the modern FCNs5" and traces its
origin to a provision of the GATT.' 2
495. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. IX(3)(a).
496. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. VI(3)(a).
497. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. VII(3)(a).
498. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VI(3)(a).
499. 1992 draft, supra note 40, art. VI(3)(a).
500. Russia BIT, supra note 71, art. VI(3)(b).
501. Id. art. VI(3)(d).
502. Id. art. VI(3)(e).
503. Panama BIT, supra note 43, art. VII(3)(d).
504. Haiti BIT, supra note 49, art. VII(3)(d).
505. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. IX(3)(d) and (e).
506. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, arts. VII(5) and VII(6).
507. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VI(3)(d) and (e).
508. Czech and Slovak Republic BITs, supra note 67, art. VI(3)(d) and (e).
509. Russia BIT, supra note 71, art. X(1).
510. Id. Protocol, para. 8.
511. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-
Japan, art. XXI(1)(d), 4 U.S.T. 2063; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Mar.
27, 1956, U.S.-Neth., art. XXII(1)(d), 8 U.S.T. 2043.
512. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
art. XXXII(b), 61 Stat. A3, TIAS NO. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
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The United States argued in the Case Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua1 3 that essential securi-
ty interest exceptions are inherently "self-judging," by which the United
States meant that a party's invocation of such an exception is not
subject to review. The International Court of Justice rejected that
argument and it appeared for a time that the United States had aban-
doned its position in that regard.51
4
The Russia BIT protocol provision, however, resurrects the U.S.
interpretation, at least insofar as the Russia BIT is concerned. A self-
judging provision, of course, is considerably broader than one measured
by an objective standard. The Russia BIT language thus appears to
open a potentially large loophole in the Russia BIT. 5 Further, to the
extent that the self-judging language reflects the implicit understanding
between the parties in other BITs, the loophole would appear in those
other BITs as well.5 6
G. Argentina
The Argentina BIT in most respects follows rather closely the 1991
draft. A few provisions, however, are novel.
1. Definition of Territory
The BIT model negotiating texts, after about mid-1981, have not
defined the territory of a party because U.S. negotiators believe that no
satisfactory definition is possible.517 The term is of some importance,
however, because the BITs generally protect investment only if it is
investment of nationals and companies of one party in the territory of
the other party.
The Argentina BIT includes a definition of the term518  that is
loosely based on a definition in a U.S. tax treaty with Indonesia.5 9
Specifically, the Argentina BIT provides that the term:
513. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U. S.) 1986 I.C.J. 4, 14, 116, (Judgment on the Merits).
514. See Vandevelde, supra note 101.
515. Id
516. Id
517. See Zaire BIT, supra note 45, Letter of Submittal (from Secretary of State George
P. Schultz to the President, Feb. 26, 1986).
518. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. l(a)(f).
519. Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Indonesia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, July 11, 1980, art. 3, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 100-22, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
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"territory" means the territory of the United States or the Argentine
Republic, including the territorial sea established in accordance with
international law as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea. This Treaty also applies in the seas and seabed
adjacent to the territorial sea in which the United States or the Argen-
tine Republic has sovereign rights or jurisdiction in accordance with
international law as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea.5 °
The reference to the Convention on the Law of the Sea is noteworthy
because the United States has not signed the Convention, although it
regards it as declaratory of customary international law in many re-
spects.521 The Romania BIT adopted the same definition of territory as
that which appeared in the Argentina BIT."
The Argentina BIT is not the first BIT to define the term territory.
The Cameroon BIT defines the term as "all the territory of a Party
recognized by international law, 523 thus adopting the approach used in
the Argentina BIT of specifying the body of law by which the term is to
be defined, rather than attempting actually to define it.
The Zaire BIT, by contrast, is much more elaborate and attempts, at
least in the case of the United States, to describe the limits of territory.
The main text of the Zaire BIT initially provides that territory means
"all territory" of the respective parties. 52 Additional language in the
protocol explains that the territory of Zaire encompasses "[a]ll Zairian
territory within its geographical and political boundaries where its
sovereignty is exercised. '12' The territory of the United States encom-
passes "the separate States, the District of Columbia, and Guam, Puerto
Rico, American Samoa, and the Virgin Islands. 526
2. Definition of Company of a Party
BIT protections generally apply to investment of nationals or com-
panies of a party. A company of a party typically is defined as a
520. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. I(a)(f).
521. James L. Malone, Freedom and Opportunities: Foundations for a Dynamic Oceans
Policy, DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1984, at 76.
522. Romania BIT, supra note 70, art. I(l)(f).
523. Cameroon BIT, supra note 46, art. I(l)(f).
524. Zaire BIT, supra note 45, art. I(f).
525. Id. Protocol, para. 7.
526. Id. The definition also should be interpreted to include the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands, which like Puerto Rico is considered a commonwealth of the
United States. The Northern Mariana Islands apparently were omitted from the definition
because, at the time the Zaire BIT was concluded, they were trust territories covered by the
Trusteeship Agreement for the Pacific Islands.
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company organized under the laws of that party. 7
Under the 1991 draft of the model negotiating text, each party
reserved the right to deny treaty protection to a company organized
under the laws of the other party if nationals of a third country con-
trolled the company, and the company had no "substantial business
activities" in the territory of the other party.528 For example, under this
approach Argentina would have reserved the right to deny treaty protec-
tion to a company organized under the laws of the United States if third
country nationals controlled the company and the company did not have
substantial business activities in the United States. Obviously, the
purpose of the provision was to prevent companies with no real connec-
tion to a BIT party from organizing under the laws of that party merely
to obtain treaty protection.
The Argentina BIT broadens this reservation of right to permit a
party to deny treaty protection to a company of the other party, if the
company is controlled by nationals of one party and does not have
substantial business activities in the territory of the other party.529 For
example, Argentina reserves the right to deny treaty protection to a
company organized under U.S. law but controlled by Argentine nation-
als, where that company lacks substantial business activities in the
United States.
This change represents a minor departure from prior BIT practice.
Under the various model negotiating texts, it had been theoretically
possible for a company organized under the laws of one party but
controlled by nationals of the other party to claim treaty protection as a
company of the first party. The model negotiating texts in use prior to
1984 would have required that nationals of the first party also have a
substantial, albeit not controlling, interest in the company.53 Even that
requirement, however, had been abandoned in 1984, thus making it
easier for a company owned or controlled by nationals of one BIT party
to be treated as a company of the other party and thereby come under
the umbrella of BIT protection.53" ' Clearly, Argentina wished to limit the
527. See, e.g., 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. I(b); 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. I(1)(a);
1987 draft, supra note 38, art. I(1)(a).
528. 1991 draft, supra note 39, art. 1(2). A separate clause in the same provision
reserved the right of a party to deny treaty protection to a company of the other party if the
company is controlled by nationals of a third country with which the denying party does not
maintain normal economic relations. This clause was not changed in the Argentina BIT.
529. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. 1(3).
530. See, e.g., 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. I(b).
531. See, e.g., 1984 draft, supra note 37, art. I(1)(a); 1987 draft, supra note 38, art.
I(1)(a).
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ability of its nationals to claim BIT protection against their own govern-
ment by incorporating under U.S. law.
3. Performance Requirements
Although the Argentina BIT contains the standard performance
requirements provision in the main text,532 the protocol addresses the
subject of performance requirements in two further provisions. As
previously noted, modifications to the performance requirements provi-
sion were not uncommon in the first wave and have appeared in a
limited fashion in the second. 33
One provision permits Argentina to maintain existing performance
requirements in the automotive sector, with certain conditions.534
Specifically, Argentina must eliminate such performance requirements
within eight years of the treaty's entry into force and must apply them
in such a manner as not to place existing investments at a competitive
disadvantage, relative to new entrants into the automotive sector. This
provision reflected the fact that the Ford Motor Company has a substan-
tial investment in Argentina which it has operated in conformity with
past performance requirements. Ford might be placed at a disadvantage
if new investors were permitted immediately to operate without regard
to such requirements.
A second provision recites the parties' agreement that they will use
best efforts to ensure that misinterpretation of the performance require-
ments provision does not adversely affect Argentina's process of privat-
izing various industries, such as public utilities.5 35 Argentina's concern
was that, in privatizing a company, it may wish to impose on the new
owners various restrictions on the operation of the investment. For
example, a privatized utility might be required to provide certain types
of service. Because the United States resists attempting to compile an
exhaustive list of what it considers to be performance requirements,
Argentina could not be certain that some of these restrictions would not
be considered performance requirements. Thus, the protocol language
memorializes the fact that the parties discussed this concern during
negotiations and shared the expectation that the BIT prohibition on
performance requirements would not be interpreted to impede Argenti-
na's planned privatization process.
532. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art, 11(5).
533. See supra text accompanying notes 400-09.
534. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, Protocol, para. 9.
535. Id. Protocol, para. 11.
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4. Customs Union Exception
The Argentina BIT modified and clarified the customs union excep-
tion contained in the 1991 draft.
36
The modification requires that the customs union be "regional."
The word "regional" had appeared in the 1987 draft 37 as well as in each
of the pre-1987 BITs that contained a customs union exception 38 but
was dropped from the 1991 draft. The Argentina BIT, in effect, modi-
fies the 1991 language to track the language used in prior BIT practice.
The clarification was to include a clause specifying that an arrange-
ment could qualify as a regional customs union or free trade area,
regardless of "whether such an arrangement is designated as a customs
union, free trade area, common market or otherwise. '5 39  Thus, the
Argentina BIT provides explicitly that the substance of the arrangement
is controlling, rather than its formal designation, a principle that presum-
ably was implicit in the model negotiating text.
5. GATT Exception
The Argentina BIT does not contain the GATT exception that had
first appeared in the Poland BIT and that subsequently had been incor-
porated in the 1991 draft.5" Thus, the general MFN provision of the
Argentina BIT requires that favorable treatment for investment granted
by either party to nationals or companies of any third country under
future GATT related agreements be extended to nationals and companies
of the other party.
6. Currency Transfers
The currency transfers article of the Argentina BIT follows the 1991
draft with a couple of minor changes of no real significance. 4' One
modification is that the illustrative list of transfers covered by the
provision is modified slightly so that the reference to "payments made
pursuant to a loan agreement" becomes "payments made pursuant to a
loan agreement directly related to an investment. ' '5 2 Because no trans-
536. I art. 11(9).
537. 1987 draft, supra note 38, art. 11(9).
538. For a listing of such BITs included prior to the 1987 draft, see supra notes 148-51.
539. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. 11(9).
540. See supra text accompanying notes 181-88.
541. See Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. V.
542. I art. V(1).
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fer is covered unless it is a transfer "related to an investment," this
change adds very little, particularly given that the list is not exhaustive
in any event.
A second minor modification is the addition of language permitting
each party to prescribe procedures for the transfer of currency, provided
that such procedures do not impair the rights set forth in the treaty."43 A
procedure which did not impair the rights set forth in the treaty would
not be prohibited by the treaty in any event and thus this provision in no
way weakens the protections afforded by the BIT.
The protocol contains a novel provision which, in effect, allows an
investor in a particular situation to waive the protection of the transfers
provision. 54 Under this provision, the parties agree that a U.S. investor
and Argentina may agree to modify the right to free transfer of pay-
ments related to an investment with respect to that part of an investment
financed through a debt-equity conversion program. In no case, howev-
er, may Argentina deny to U.S. investors national or MFN treatment
with respect to the transfer of returns or of proceeds from the sale or
liquidation of such an investment.
In the absence of this provision, nothing in the treaty would have
precluded an investor from waiving its right to free transfers. Argenti-
na's obligations under the BIT, however, technically are to the United
States. Thus, even where an investor is prepared to forego a protection
afforded by the treaty, the United States would retain the right to insist
that the protection be afforded. Accordingly, the significance of the
protocol provision is that it constitutes consent by the United States to
the relinquishment of the right of free transfer in a limited group of
cases where the investor involved also consents. This provision was
included at the suggestion of the United States as a means of encourag-
ing debt-equity conversions.
7. Investor-to-State Dispute Provision
The negotiation of a BIT with Argentina that contained an investor-
to-State dispute provision was a considerable accomplishment, given that
Argentina was a longstanding adherent to the Calvo Doctrine and indeed
the native land of Dr. Calvo himself. Ultimately, Argentina agreed to
the inclusion of an investor-to-State dispute provision without any
substantive concessions from the United States. The provision negotiat-
ed with Argentina eventually was incorporated almost verbatim in the
543. let art. V(2).
544. Id, Protocol, para. 10.
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1992 draft and is described above 4'
One novel provision that was not incorporated into the 1992 draft
appears in the protocol.' It states that the investor may be required
during arbitration to provide evidence of its ownership or control. This,
of course, was implicit in all prior BITs. The ownership or control of
the investor party is relevant to the tribunal's jurisdiction and like any
relevant fact, if contested, it must be established by the party whose
claim rests upon the fact.
8. State-to-State Dispute Provision
The Argentina BIT contains minor changes to the State-to-State
dispute provision. First, the appointing authority is the Secretary Gener-
al of the Permanent Court of Arbitration rather than the Secretary
General of ICSID.547 This change apparently reflects the fact. that
Argentina had not yet adhered to the ICSID Convention and thus did
not want to specify a role for an ICSID official. A similar change
appears in the Romania5 48 and Bulgaria5 49 BITs.
The second change was to delete the language authorizing the
tribunal to direct one party to pay a greater share of the arbitration costs
than the other party. The Argentina BIT replaces that clause with
language specifying that the expenses of the arbitration panel shall be
borne equally by the parties.55° Similar language appears in the Bulgar-
ia,55' Cameroon, 52 Morocco, 53 and Bangladesh 54 BITs.
9. Nonprecluded Measures Provision
The nonprecluded measures provision of the 1991 draft excludes
from BIT coverage measures taken by a party necessary to fulfill its
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of internation-
al peace and security.555 This language was intended as a reference to a
party's obligations under the United Nations Charter. The Argentina
545. See supra text accompanying notes 201-53.
546. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, Protocol, para. 1.
547. Id. art. VIII(2).
548. Romania BIT, supra note 70, art. VII(2).
549. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VII(2).
550. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. VIII(4).
551. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VII(4).
552. Cameroon BIT, supra note 46, art. VIII(7).
553. Morocco BIT, supra note 44, art. VII(4).
554. Bangladesh BIT, supra note 47, art. VIII(6).
555. 1991 draft, supra note 39, art. X(1).
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BIT contains a provision which makes this meaning explicit. 56  Al-
though fully consistent with the understanding of U.S. BIT negotiators,
this language had not appeared in any prior BIT.
10. Relationship with FCN
Another novel provision of the Argentina BIT contains the parties'
acknowledgement and agreement that, in the event of any inconsistency
between the terms of the BIT and the terms of the 1853 FCN between
Argentina and the United States,5 7 the terms of the BIT shall control." 8
This is merely a specific application of the general principle of custom-
ary international law, codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties,559 which states that, in the event of a conflict between two
treaties, the later in time prevails.
One practical effect of the subordination of the 1853 FCN to the
BIT is to solve a problem that the 1853 FCN had caused in the negotia-
tion of other BITs. Specifically, article IX of the 1853 FCN had grant-
ed to Argentine nationals the right of national treatment with respect to
ownership of real estate in the United States, the only U.S. treaty to do
so. Various of the fifty States, however, have enacted restrictions on
alien ownership of real estate.56° If a BIT granted to nationals of the
other party MFN treatment with respect to the right of ownership of real
property, then such nationals would have acquired the right of national
treatment, thereby creating the possibility that the BIT would have
conflicted with some of the State restrictions. Accordingly, the United
States had included in the BITs language exempting ownership of real
property from the general MFN obligation.
61
The Argentina BIT explicitly reserves to the parties the right to
make exceptions to national treatment with respect to the ownership of
real property. 562 In so doing, it overrides the guarantee of national
treatment with respect to ownership of real property in the 1853 FCN.
556. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, Protocol, para. 6.
557. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, July 27, 1853, U.S.-Arg., 10 Stat.
1005.
558. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, Protocol, para. 7.
559. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature, May 23, 1969,
art. 30, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
560. See James A. Frechter, Note, Alien Land Ownership in the United States, XIV
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 147 (1988).
561. See, e.g., 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. II(3)(a); 1984 draft, supra note 37, art.
11(1). The exemption from national treatment was effected by placing ownership of real
estate in the annex.
562. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, Protocol, para. 2.
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Since Argentina no longer has the right to national treatment, other
States will not obtain the right through general MFN guarantees in their
BITs. This eliminates the potential for conflict between the MFN
language of the BITs and State restrictions on the ownership of real
property.563 At the same time, it eliminates the need to exclude owner-
ship of real property from the general MFN provisions of other BITs.
However, to prevent a potential conflict between the BITs and State
restrictions on alien land ownership, the BITs still must except owner-
ship of real estate from the right of national treatment, and they continue
to do so in the annexes.
11. Retroactivity of the BIT
The Argentina BIT addresses explicitly the retroactivity of its
provisions. The protocol states that "the provisions of this Treaty do
not bind either Party in relation to any act or fact which took place or
any situation which ceased to exist before the date of entry into force of
this Treaty.,"56' This language tracks a provision of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties 565 and thus merely states explicitly the
customary rule that would have applied even without the language.
Similar language appears in the Romania BIT.566
It had been understood, in any event, that BIT-created rules do not
apply to events which occur prior to the treaty's entry into force.5 67
Indeed, the very purpose of establishing a date on which a treaty enters
into force is to fix the time at which treaty rules begin to apply to the
actions of the parties.
The question whether a treaty is retroactive, however, actually
comprises several distinct questions, not all of which are addressed by
the Argentina BIT protocol language. One question, for example, is
whether the BIT applies to existing investment. All of the model
negotiating texts provided that the BIT applies to all investment estab-
lished before the BIT's entry into force.568 Many BIT parties sought to
exclude existing investment from coverage under the theory that cover-
563. It also eliminates the potential conflict between the 1853 FCN and various state
laws.
564. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, Protocol, para. 8.
565. Vienna Convention, supra note 559, art. 28.
566. Romania BIT, supra note 70, Protocol, para. 4.
567. See generally VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 65-67.
568. See, e.g., 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. XIII(2); 1984 draft, supra note 37, art.
XII(I); 1987 draft, supra note 38, art. XIII(I).
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age for such investment constituted a "windfall" for the investor. 69 The
United States consistently refused, however, to exclude classes of U.S.
investment from full or partial BIT coverage.57° The Argentina BIT
does not appear to alter the 1991 draft in this respect. Although the
substantive provisions of the BIT do not apply to conduct by the United
States or Argentina occurring prior to the BIT's entry into force, those
provisions will apply to future conduct by either party with respect to
investment existing at the time the treaty enters into force.
Another question is whether the BIT's remedial provisions apply to
a dispute already in existence at the time the BIT enters into force.
Assuming, for example, that an investment had been expropriated by the
host State prior to the BIT's entry into force, and even conceding that
the measure of compensation would not be governed by the BIT's
substantive provisions, could the investor nevertheless invoke the inves-
tor-to-State dispute provision as a remedy for the expropriation? The
BITs have traditionally been silent on this question, although the negoti-
ating history of the Panama BIT reflects the assumption of both parties
that the BIT's dispute provisions would apply to previously existing
disputes, once the BIT entered into force.57'
H. Romania
The Romania BIT follows the 1992 draft, but includes several
modifications inspired by the Argentina BIT and other modifications
which are characteristic of many Eastern European BITs.
1. Definition of Investment
The Romania BIT adds to its definition of the term "investment" an
explicit reference to "concessions to search for, extract or exploit natural
resources." '572 It long has been the position of many developed countries
that mineral concession agreements could constitute property under
international law.573 Further, the early model negotiating texts explicitly
had included, within the definition of investment, "rights to search for or
569. VANDEVELDE, supra note 1, at 32-33.
570. Id.
571. Id. at 66.
572. Romania BIT, supra note 70, art. I(1)(a)(v).
573. See, e.g., Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern
Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 474, 477-78
(1991); Earnest E. Smith & John S. Dzienkowski, A Fifty Year Perspective on World
Petroleum Arrangements, 24 TEx. INT'L. L. J. 13 (1984).
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utilize natural resources ... This language had been deleted from
the 1984 and subsequent drafts as surplusage. The Romania BIT merely
makes explicit that which had been implicit in the BITs negotiated after
1984.
2. Definition of Associated Activities
Like the BITs with Poland,575 Russia, 76 the Czech and Slovak
Republics, 77 Kazakhstan,578 Armenia, 79 Bulgaria,580 and Kyrgyzstan 81
the Romania BIT includes a list of additional activities which are to be
considered "associated activities" within the meaning of the BIT.582 The
activities are those which traditionally have posed problems for foreign
investors in Eastern European countries. The Romania and Russia BITs
differ from the other agreements in that, rather than inserting a special
separate provision defining these activities as associated activities, the
Romania BIT simply includes them in its general definition of that term
- a stylistic improvement.
3. Definition of Territory
The Romania BIT includes the definition of territory583 that had
appeared in the Argentina BIT.
84
4. State-to-State Dispute Provision
As in the Argentina 585 and Bulgaria 586 BITs, the State-to-State
dispute provision of the Romania BIT modifies the language of the 1992
draft to provide that the appointing authority shall be the Secretary
General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration rather than the Secretary
574. See, e.g., 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. I(c)(vi).
575. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. 11(8).
576. Russia BIT, supra note 71, art. I(1)(e).
577. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. 11(10).
578. Kazakhstan BIT, supra note 68, art. 11(10).
579. Armenia BIT, supra note 64, art. 11(10).
580. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. 11(10).
581. Kyrgyzstan BIT, supra note 69, art. 11(10).
582. Romania BIT, supra note 70, art. I(l)(e).
583. Id. art. I(1)(f). For a discussion of the definition, see supra text accompanying
notes 517-26.
584. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. I(l)(f).
585. Id. art. VIII(2).
586. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VII(2).
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General of ICSID.587 The Romania BIT also differs from the 1992 draft
in its inclusion of a provision explicitly stating that each party is to bear
its own costs of arbitration.588 Such language had been standard in the
early model negotiating texts,589 but had been omitted beginning with
the 1984 draft on the grounds that it was implicit.
5. Customs Unions
The Romania BIT contains the standard customs union exception
from the 1992 draft.59° In addition, special language in the protocol
states that the customs union exception applies if the economic rela-
tionship between a party and a third country includes a free trade area
or customs union. 59' The obvious intent is to ensure that an economic
(and perhaps political) union that went beyond the traditional definition
of a customs union or free trade area fit within this exception in the
BIT.
The protocol language does not appear to alter the interpretation that
the United States otherwise would have placed on the customs union
exception. At the same time, it provides some assurance to Romania
that, should it join the European Community or integrate in some form
with other Eastern European States or any former Soviet republics, the
BIT exception would apply, as long as the arrangement included a
customs union or free trade area. The BITs with the Czech and Slovak
Republics have similar language.592
6. Retroactivity of the BIT
Like the Argentina BIT, the Romania BIT contains language in the
protocol which addresses the retroactivity of the agreement.593 The
language is virtually identical to that which appears in the Argentina
BIT.5 94
7. Foreign Investment Office
The Romania BIT is accompanied by a side letter dated May 28,
587. Romania BIT, supra note 70, art. VII(2).
588. Id. art. VII(4)(a).
589. See, e.g., 1983 draft, supra note 36, art. VIII(7).
590. Romania BIT, supra note 70, art. II(9)(a).
591. Id. Protocol, para. 2.
592. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, Protocol, para. 3.
593. Romania BIT, supra note 70, Protocol, para. 4.
594. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, Protocol, para. 8. For a discussion of this language,
see supra text accompanying notes 564-71.
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1992, under which Romania agrees to designate an office to assist U.S.
nationals and companies in obtaining the full benefits of the treaty. The
office is to serve as a "coordinator and problem solver" for U.S. inves-
tors experiencing difficulties. The office, in particular, will provide
information on investment laws, investment projects, and sources of
finance; coordinate with national and local government agencies to
facilitate investment and resolve disputes; and assist in the repatriation
of profits. The BITs with Poland, 95 Bulgaria,596 and the Czech and
Slovak Republics 597 contain similar provisions.
I. Kazakhstan
The Kazakhstan BIT follows the 1992 draft rather closely. One
change is that it includes a list of additional activities that are to be
considered "associated activities" within the meaning of the BIT.598 The
activities are those which traditionally have posed problems for foreign
investors in Eastern European countries. Similar provisions appear in
the BITs with Poland,599 Russia,60° the Czech and Slovak Republics, 6°1
Romania,6 Armenia,603 Bulgaria,6 and Kyrgyzstan6s
J. Armenia
The Armenia BIT also resembles the 1992 draft, except that it
includes the special list of associated activities common to BITs with
East European countries and former Soviet Republics. 6M
K. Bulgaria
The Bulgaria BIT is based on the 1991 draft, with several deviations
generally inspired by the Poland BIT.
595. Poland BIT, supra note 62, Exchange of Letters (Mar. 21, 1990).
596. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, Exchange of Letters (Sept. 23, 1992).
597. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, Exchange of Letters (Oct. 22, 1991).
598. Kazakhstan BIT, supra note 68, art. 11(10).
599. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. 11(8).
600. Russia BIT, supra note 71, art. I (1)(e).
601. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. 11(10).
602. Romania BIT, supra note 70, art. I (1)(e).
603. Armenia BIT, supra note 64, art. 11 (10).
604. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. 11 (10).
605. Kyrgyzstan BIT, supra note 69, art. 11(10).
606. See supra text accompanying notes 437-44.
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1. Definition of Investment
The Bulgaria BIT contains one unique provisin. Language in the
protocol provides that the term "investment" as used in the treaty shall
not apply to loans that were extended prior to January 1, 1992 to the
Bulgarian government or to banks owned or controlled by the Bulgarian
government and that are subsequently rescheduled in the London
Club. 7
2. Definition of Associated Activities
The Bulgaria BIT includes a list of additional activities considered
to be associated activities within the meaning of the treaty."8 Similar
lists appear in the BITs with Poland,6°9 Russia,61° the Czech and Slovak
Republics,6 1' Romania,6'2 Kazakhstan,613 Armenia,614 and Kyrgyzstan. 615
3. Investor-to-State Dispute Provision
The Bulgaria BIT modifies the definition of an investment dispute in
a way that does not appear to affect the substance of the rights guaran-
teed by the 1991 draft. Specifically, the Bulgaria BIT provides that "the
denial of an investment authorization shall not in itself constitute an
investment dispute unless such denial involves an alleged breach of any
right conferred or created by the Treaty. 6 6 Because under the 1991
draft investment disputes included only disputes involving a breach of a
treaty right or the interpretation or application of an investment agree-
ment or authorization, an investment authorization presumably could not
give rise to an investment dispute until such time as the authorization
was granted. Denial of an investment authorization could give rise to a
dispute under the 1991 draft only if it violated some provision of the
607. The London Club refers to the process whereby sovereign debt to commercial banks
is rescheduled or refinanced. See generally Richard W. Edwards, Jr., Is an IMF Stand-by
Arrangement a "Seal of Approval" on Which Other Creditors Can Rely?, 17 N.Y.U. J. IrNT'L
L. & POL. 573 (1985); Karen Hudes, Coordination of Paris and London Club Rescheduling,
17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 553 (1985).
608. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. II(10).
609. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. 11(8).
610. Russia BIT, supra note 71, art. I(1)(e).
611. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. 11(10).
612. Romania BIT, supra note 70, art. I(1)(e).
613. Kazakhstan BIT, supra note 68, art. 11(10).
614. Armenia BIT, supra note 64, art. 11(10).
615. Kyrgyzstan BIT, supra note 69, art.II(10).
616. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art VI(1)(c).
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treaty, such as the provision guaranteeing national and MFN treatment
with respect to the right to establish investment. Thus, the Bulgaria BIT
language does not appear to modify in substance the 1991 draft.
A parallel, but different, provision appears in the Poland BIT. The
Poland BIT, unlike the Bulgaria BIT, reserved for each party the right to
deny national and MFN treatment with respect to the right to establish
investment 67 and then provided in addition that a denial of an invest-
ment authorization would not constitute an investment dispute. 618 Thus,
the counterpart provision in the Poland BIT was a substantive departure
from the model negotiating texts.
The Bulgaria BIT follows the Poland BIT 619 in authorizing the
investor potentially to invoke any one of four conciliation or arbitration
mechanisms: (1) ICSID; (2) the Additional Facility; (3) ad hoc arbitra-
tion under the UNCITRAL rules; or (4) ad hoc arbitration under the
rules of any other arbitral institution mutually agreed upon by the
parties.620 The same set of choices was provided for in the BITs with
Argentina,621 Russia622 and the Czech and Slovak Republics 623 as well as
in those BITs based on the 1992 draft. As in the case of these other
BITs, however, some of the choices may be illusory because the Bulgar-
ia BIT constitutes unconditional consent only to use of the Additional
Facility and to ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL rules.62 The
BIT also will constitute consent to proceedings before ICSID if Bulgaria
becomes a party to the ICSID Convention.625 Like the Poland BIT,626
the Bulgaria BIT provides that, in the event of arbitration under
UNCITRAL rules, the appointing authority shall be the Secretary
General of ICSID. 627
The Bulgaria BIT again follows the Poland BIT628 in containing
additional provisions to ensure the enforceability of awards under the
investor-to-State dispute provision. These additional provisions:
(1) require the place of any arbitration to be in a country which is a
617. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. 11(l).
618. Id. art. IX(I).
619. Id art. IX(3).
620. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VI(3)(a).
621. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. VII(3)(a).
622. Russia BIT, supra note 71, art. VI(3)(a).
623. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. VI(3)(a).
624. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VI(3)(b).
625. Id. art. VI(3)(b)(i).
626. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. IX (3)(b)(ii).
627. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VI(3)(b)(iii).
628. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. IX (3)(b).
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party to the New York Convention;629 (2) set forth an undertaking by
each party to carry out without delay the provisions of any award
resulting from arbitration under the investor-to-State dispute provision;
630
and (3) mandate that each party provide for the enforcement in its
territory of any such award.63' Similar provisions alsoappeared in BITs
with Haiti,632 Panama,633 Poland,634 Russia,635 the Czech and Slovak
Republics, 636 and Argentina,637 and in the BITs based on the 1992 draft.
4. State-to-State Dispute Provision
The State-to-State dispute provision of the Bulgaria BIT modifies
the language of the 1991 draft in some minor respects. First, the
appointing authority shall be the Secretary General of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration, rather than the Secretary General of ICSID.638 The
Argentina 639 and Romania' BITs included a similar change. Second,
the Bulgaria BIT does not authorize the tribunal to require one party to
pay a higher proportion of the costs of the arbitration and, indeed,
provides that such costs shall be borne equally by the parties.641 A
similar change appears in the Argentina, 642 Cameroon, 43 Morocco,6" and
Bangladesh 5 BITs. The Bulgaria BIT also states explicitly that each
party is to bear the costs of its own representation, 646 a matter that had
been left implicit in the 1991 draft.
629. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VI(3)(d).
630. Id. art. VI(3)(e).
631. Id.
632. Haiti BIT, supra note 49, art. VII(3)(d), (e). The Haiti BIT does not include the
understanding to carry out the award without delay.
633. Panama BIT, supra note 43, art. VII(3)(d). The Panama BIT includes only the
requirement that the parties provide for the enforcement of the award in their territory.
634. Poland BIT, supra note 62, art. IX(3)(d), (e).
635. Russia BIT, supra note 71, art. VI(3)(d), (e).
636. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, art. VI(3)(d), (e).
637. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. VII(5), (6).
638. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VII(2).
639. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. VIII (2).
640. Romania BIT, supra note 70, art. VII(2).
641. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VII(4).
642. Argentina BIT, supra note 63, art. VIII(4).
643. Cameroon BIT, supra note 46, art VIII(7).
644. Morocco BIT, supra note 44, art. VII(4).
645. Bangladesh BIT, supra note 47, art. VIII(6).
646. Bulgaria BIT, supra note 65, art. VII(4).
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5. Foreign Investment Office
The Bulgaria BIT contains an exchange of notes confirming Bulgar-
ia's agreement to create an office to assist U.S. investors in deriving the
full benefits of the treaty. Among the specific duties of the office will
be providing information on business regulations, investment projects,
and sources of finance; coordinating with Bulgarian agencies to facilitate
investment and resolve disputes; and assisting U.S. investors experienc-
ing difficulties with repatriating profits or obtaining foreign exchange.
The BITs with Poland," 7 Romania," and the Czech and Slovak Repub-
lics649 have similar provisions.
L. Kyrgyzstan
The Kyrgyzstan BIT adheres very closely to the 1992 draft. It
includes a list of associated activities that traditionally have posed
problems for investors in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, similar
to that which appears in the other BITs with former Soviet republics or
East European countries. 650 Additionally, it makes some minor stylistic
changes to the expropriation article.65'
CONCLUSION
The second wave of BITs reflects the considerable continuity and
consistency in the program. After more than ten years of negotiation
and twenty-three signed agreements, the BIT program has changed little
from the original conception.
All of the major provisions of the early model negotiating texts
remain intact. The United States continues to refuse to compromise on
the issues of compensation for expropriation and the right of investors to
binding, third-party arbitration of investment disputes.
Although compromises on the principles of national and MFN
treatment have been made, such compromises were anticipated from the
inception of the program and, particularly in the case of national treat-
ment, the BIT was structured to accommodate such compromises. Most
compromises on other important provisions, principally on the right of
free transfer, were made relatively early in the program and subsequent
647. Poland BIT, supra note 62, Exchange of Letters (Mar. 21, 1990).
648. Romania BIT, supra note 65, Exchange of Letters (May 28, 1992).
649. Czech and Slovak BITs, supra note 67, Exchange of Letters (Oct. 22, 1991).
650. See supra text accompanying 485-93.
651. Kyrgyzstan BIT, supra note 69, arts. 111 (1), (2).
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compromises on such provisions have departed little from those early
precedents.
The continuity is all the more remarkable, given the phenomenal
changes in the world that have taken place during the decade between
1982 and 1992, including the collapse of the Soviet empire and the
decline of the United States as a net exporter of capital. The collapse of
the Soviet empire by and large has been favorable to the BIT program.
Not only did this eliminate the principal alternative model of economic
organization to the free-market model underlying the BIT, but it also has
resulted in the emergence of a large number of States seeking a major
influx of foreign direct investment. The transformation of the U.S.
economy, by contrast, generally should disfavor the BIT program
because it creates political pressure for a protectionist policy in lieu of
the BIT's free market approach. Thus far, however, the rise of protec-
tionist sentiment has had no clearly discernible impact on BIT negotia-
tions. Whether it has an impact on the ability of the United States to
abide by BIT obligations remains to be seen.
Yet, the second wave of negotiations is not without its distinctive
features. By far the most significant is an erosion of the original policy
of using the BITs to take investment matters out of the politically driven
realm of foreign policy, both to protect foreign policy from the disrup-
tive effect of private investment disputes and to ensure that U.S. invest-
ment abroad had legal protection that would be to some extent insulated
from the vagaries of foreign policy. The result of this erosion has been
twofold: a greater willingness to use BITs as political symbols and some
modifications in the BIT terms themselves.
One such modification to the BITs is of special importance. The
decision by the United States to characterize the essential security
interests exception as self-judging has opened a potentially large loop-
hole in the BITs, although the number of BITs in which the language
must be regarded as self-judging remains unclear.652
Another distinctive feature of the second wave has been the pro-
gram's infiltration of geographic areas previously closed to. the BITs.
Whereas the Soviet bloc once represented a formidable ideological foe
of the BIT program, the former members of that bloc now represent the
most fertile source of new BIT partners. Similarly, although U.S. BIT
negotiators have had discussions with Latin American states from the
inception of the program, it has not been until the second wave that a
strong adherent of the Calvo doctrine, Argentina, signed a BIT.
652. See supra text accompanying notes 509-16.
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A newly emerging feature of the second wave has been the in-
creased regionalization of investment policy and the concomitant move
away from the MFN standard. All of the BITs concluded after 1987
permit exceptions to the MFN obligations of the BIT attributable to
membership in a customs union or free trade area. Further, the BITs
based on the 1991 or 1992 drafts allow exemptions from the general
MFN obligations for concessions made in the Uruguay Round and allow
the parties unilaterally to exclude entire sectors of their economies from
the treaty's general MFN obligations simply by listing the sectors in the
annex. This represents a considerable departure from prior practice,
which had permitted derogations from the general MFN requirement
only where the parties specially agreed to such derogations in the treaty
text or the annex.
The prognosis for the BIT program is excellent. It has produced
more agreements in ten years of negotiation than the post-war FCN
program produced in twenty. The BITs offer more and stronger
protections for investment than any prior U.S. treaty program, and BITs
have been concluded with many developing or formerly communist
countries that historically had opposed the free-market regime represent-
ed by the BITs.
Perhaps the most important question still to be resolved is how
much impact the BITs will have in practice. Unfortunately, much of the
impact may be impossible to detect or measure. Host States that are
deterred by BIT provisions from taking actions that would impair
investment can hardly be expected to advertise that fact. The utility of
the BITs will be most visible where their dispute provisions are used to
obtain relief for an injured investor. Yet, the more effective the BIT as
a preventive instrument, the less investors will need to invoke the
dispute provisions. In short, the failures of the BIT program will be far
more visible than its successes. In the end, the real contribution of the
BIT program to investment protection may never be known.
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